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Commercial Fishing: 97-441 ENR CONTENTS FOR THIS SECTION
Oregon Salmon, 1983-86. 37 Although signs of stock depletion were already becoming apparent, the implementation of a July 1969 court decision 38 reduced the amount of salmon available to non-Native fishermen. This eventually led to a license retirement scheme targeted at Oregon's Columbia River salmon gilinet fishery. Access to the fishery was restricted in 1980, when 572 permits were issued. In 1983, 510 licenses were renewed, the rest having been retired through natural attrition. Four rounds of retirements took place between 1983 and 1986.39 In each case, bids for retirement of the licenses were sought, and in each round the bids were over-subscribed. Altogether, 133 licenses were bought back. Federal ftinding of $715,000 was provided, and average successful bids rose from $3,600 in the first round to $6,186 in the final one. The retirement scheme likely caused license prices to rise but, as not all were eligible for retirement and an individual could only sell one license under the scheme, this rise was not great. About 26% of the valid licenses held in the early 1980s were retired. For unknown reasons and despite an obvious market for licenses, a further 4% were not renewed by holders. However, 25% of the vessels that surrendered licenses remained in the fishery as they also held Washington state licenses. The buyout was judged a success as aggregate fleet harvest costs were reduced by more than the cost of the scheme, and the scheme also brought extra money into the affected local communities. License prices continued to rise after closure of the scheme. However, subsequent developments, discussed later, indicate that the capacity reduction achieved was not sufficient to prevent further problems in the fishery. Washington Salmon, 1981-1986.40 A license retirement followed the vessel buyback scheme outlined earlier. Funded at $2.5 million annually from 1981-85 and $1 million in 1986, the retirement targeted specific funds at each of the sectors (seine, troll, gillnet, and charter) within the Washington state salmon fleet. In the first years of the scheme, funding was also provided to purchase commitments that vessels leave the fishery and not return for at least 10 years. Compensation was set at 30% of the value of each vessel, as decided by an independent surveyor. Between 1981 and 1986, 32% of the Washington licenses were removed,41 dropping the total number of licenses from 5,681 to 3,857. The proportion lost from each sector varied, from 13% for seine vessels to 43% for trollers. Many vessels involved in the buyout and compensation schemes had a history of fishing in southeast Alaska for part of the year, and it is thought that they chose to concentrate efforts there after surrendering their Washington state licenses. License holders applying for retirement were ranked in order, depending on the length of their history in the fishery and the date of their application. Licenses were purchased strictly according to this rank and, as a result, a separate market developed within the fishery for those licenses least eligible for retirement. It is thought that this prevented the license retirement from having much effect on values. Northwest Emergency Assiatance Plan. As part of the Northwest Emergency Assistance Plan, discussed earlier, $4 million in federal money was made available for a license retirement program, administered by the Washington Department of Fish and Game. Three sectors of the salmon fishery in Washington -- troll, gillnet, and charterboat -- were allocated separate funds, and licenses were chosen after individual bids were received. To be eligible, vessels had to have fished for at least 1 year between 1986 and 1991 and been able to demonstrate an uninsured loss in the fishery.42 The program was heavily over-subscribed, with more than 460 applications. It had been hoped to withdraw as much as 50% of the troll and gillnet capacity. However, only 190 of 666 eligible troll licenses (28%) were bought, 83 of 506 gillnet licenses (16%), and 23 of 206 charter licenses (11%), with modest administrative costs (3% of total expenditures).43 The number of vessels remaining in the fishery is significantly higher than the number defined as "optimum" (1,084 compared to 600) by the Washington Department of Fish and Game in 1991. Part II of the program was announced on October 31, 1996.44 An additional $5.2 million has been allocated for additional retirements, to be implemented over the next 2 years. Bids for license retirement are to be ranked according to a ratio of the offering price divided by a "salmon disaster impact" which incorporates a fisherman's recent gross salmon fishery income. The lowest ratios are to be purchased first. British Columbia Pacific Salmon Revitalization Strategy (Mifflin Plan). The British Columbia (BC) salmon fishery is similar in many respects to those in Washington and Oregon. In 1995, approximately 10,600 fishermen were directly dependent on the BC salmon fishery for their livelihoods, often residing in small communities disproportionately dependent on fishing. Despite earlier capacity reduction schemes, overcapacity is still a major problem. It was estimated that a 50% reduction in vessel numbers would still leave sufficient capacity to harvest the catch in years of peak salmon abundance.45 This overcapacity has caused severe economic problems -- between 1991 and 1994, the mean value of BC salmon landings was C$211 million, compared to mean costs (including capital and depreciation) of C$240 million. The problem worsened in 1995 due to declining salmon abundance, and the 1996 fishery was expected to record the lowest landings in 50 years. The Revitalization Strategy was implemented to help deal with this problem, and included both short- and long-term measures. An $80 million voluntary retirement was proposed. The scheme paid market prices for licenses surrendered, and it was forecast that the funding, which came from federal government, would be sufficient to remove 20% of the licenses from the fishery. The introduction of landing charges in 1997 is expected to provide sufficient funds for retirement of a further 10% of salmon licenses. Area licensing was also established. Vessels would have to choose one of two areas for seine vessels, or one of three areas for trollers and gillnetters. Any vessel wishing to fish in more than one area would be required to purchase additional licenses. It was thought that "stacking" licenses in this manner would reduce vessel numbers by a further 20%. In view of the disastrous season forecast for 1996, vessels were also given the option of not paying the 1996 license fee, and of returning to the fishery in 1997. Preliminary reports 46 indicate that the level of retirement was correctly forecast: 48 seine licenses (9% of the total), 451 gillnet licenses (18%), and 309 troll licenses (24%) were bought --19% of the combined total for all salmon gear. In addition, 205 vessels chose not to fish in 1996, and 246 licenses were stacked, although this is a preliminary total and may ultimately be higher. The increased market for licenses caused license prices to rise by between 50% and 100%. The scheme has , however, drawn considerable criticism from certain sectors of the industry. Small-vessel fishermen from ports close to the border between adjacent new areas complain that they are being forced to choose between purchasing a second license or abandoning areas they have traditionally fished. Critics of the license stacking proposal suggest that it favors the larger firms within the industry. The seiner fleet, which takes a disproportionately large amount of the catch, is already dominated by a few large companies that have the economic strength to increase their stake by stacking licenses at the expense of the smaller fishermen. Although licenses have also become 'gear-specific," critics point out that, as licenses may be transferred to vessels as much as 30% larger, the reduction in vessel numbers will not be matched by a similar reduction in capacity. Canadian Atlantic Groundfish Strategy. The closure of the Canadian Atlantic cod fisheries, starting with the northern cod fishery in July 1992, and subsequently also encompassing some redfish, flatfish, and white hake fisheries by 1994, made worldwide news. As part of a C$1.9 billion government aid package, C$270 million was earmarked for a capacity reduction program, designed to reduce capacity within the fleet to that sustainable by the fishery when it recovers. Newfoundland was by far the most affected province, with 85% of license holders affected --7,000 in all. Of these, 4,500 met strict eligibility criteria concerning reliance on the fishery and were classed as "core" fishermen. Core fishermen wishing to surrender groundfish licenses had, additionally, to surrender all other fishing licenses and would be ineligible for income support provided by the relief package or to participate in any Canadian fishery in the future. Reverse bids were sought, with bids then ranked according to vessel size and landings records. Four rounds of retirement were initially planned, the first of which received 1,250 bids. However, many of the bids were exploratory, and were considered to be too high; only 177 licenses were bought back, at a cost of C$19 million. Bids in the second round were considered to be much more realistic, and 207 licenses were bought at a cost of C$26 million from 1,050 bids that were received. It was estimated that another C$25 million could have been spent in Newfoundland alone, while still obtaining the same value for money. Altogether, a total of C$60 million was spent on the purchase of licenses, C$50 million of it in Newfoundland. The initial intent, at the time of the first round, had been to remove as much capacity as possible. However, a subsequent cabinet directive required that retirement be balanced across different gear types. Understanding that fishing capacity is the product of technology expressed among the units fishing and not merely the number of fishermen, critics viewed the elimination of fixed gear as resulting in almost no reduction in fishing capacity, while a greater reduction of the mobile sector would have been more effective. Further retirement rounds were canceled after the money earmarked for retirement was transferred to the aid program. Reduction has not been sufficient to achieve the initial objective of matching capacity to the resource, despite introduction of additional license restrictions and transfer rules. Estimates of capacity removed by the scheme are around 10%, considerably less than the target 50% reduction discussed initially by politicians. Based on scientific assessment, fishing mortality exceeded the optimum target of 20% by 4 or 5 times. Thus, an even larger reduction in fishing capacity would have been necessary, since this high fishing mortality was achieved when only a fraction of the fishing capacity was being used. Gear Retirement Florida Net Ban. A ban on several types of nets in waters under Florida jurisdiction (waters within 3 nautical miles of the shoreline in the Atlantic and within 8 nautical miles in the Gulf) was implemented on July 1 1995, following a successful referendum and amendment to the state constitution. Gilinets were banned entirely, while seine and trawl nets were restricted to not larger than 500 square feet. Reasons for the ban included alleged stock depletion of mullet, damage done by shrimp trawlers to fish stocks and the seabed, and increasing pressure from the growing number of recreational fishermen for a greater share of the resource. The Florida Marine Fisheries Commission estimated that approximately 2,500 of the state's 8,000 commercial fishermen would be adversely affected by the net ban, many of them in small communities with little alternative employment. In an attempt to minimize the impact of the ban, a gear retirement scheme was implemented, along with a package of other measures such as increased entitlement to unemployment compensation for affected individuals. Fixed prices for four categories of nets were paid, and fishermen were allowed to surrender a maximum amount of netting determined by their catch history over the previous 3 years. A total of $20 million was spent for net retirement, and nets purchased were recycled. The gear ban and retirement have caused considerable controversy within the state. A significant portion of the retirement money (alleged to be as much as half) was spent on nets modified in some way to artificially increase their value according to the retirement rule. Difficulties in interpreting and defining the amendment have led to numerous court cases.47 Despite apparent flouting of the law, mullet stocks appear to be recovering. The net ban appears to have had little adverse effect on the value of total state landings, as increased offshore fishing and shrimping has increased landings in this sector. However, inshore fishermen unable to upgrade their vessels have been adversely affected, and the few alternative fisheries available to them, such as crabs, are now under significant threat of overfishing. Values of inshore vessels have also fallen dramatically. The effects of the ban appear, at this early stage, to be a decline in overall employment in commercial fisheries (mainly within smaller communities), increased landings in the offshore sector, and recovery of a small number of depleted stocks. Magnuson-Steuens Act Provisious Future fishing capacity reduction programs (FCRPs) within the United States can be implemented under the 1996 amendments to the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act detailed in sections 116(a) and 303 of P.L. 104-297, signed into law by President Clinton on October 11, 1996. This measure provides that the Secretary of Commerce, at the request of either a regional fishery management council or state Governor, may introduce a FCRP if it is deemed necessary to address overfishing, provided access to the fishery is restricted and catch limitation measures are in place. Vessels must be permanently withdrawn from the fishery. Industry-funded programs will be allowed, provided that a two-thirds vote of eligible license holders favors such a program. Fees will not be allowed to exceed 5% of the total value of fish landed in fishery whose capacity is to be reduced. Many argue that apparent need for economic aid indicates underlying problems within a fishery, that an economically healthy fishery is able to cope with periodic natural disasters without outside help. Nonetheless, aid has been used to counter economic devastation of some communities from both human-made and natural disasters. However, it is also argued that, while disaster relief may be necessary in the short-term, it will become a regular and significant drain on public resources if the underlying problems within the fisheries are not tackled. In such case, the aid would become little more than a subsidy for a fundamentally unprofitable industry. The Interjurisdictional Fisheries Act (Title III of P.L. 99-659) recognizes this, by requiring economic aid to be given only "after the Secretary of Commerce determines that adequate conservation and management measures are in place," it aims to remove many of the factors causing the need for this aid, the most pressing of which is overcapitalization. Critics of economic aid argue that healthy industries are inherently resilient, and that, rather than subsidizing and promoting permanent dependency by a faltering industry, the federal government should compassionately assist a reorganization of ailing elements of the fishing industry that is led by people from fishing communities and from within the fishing industry. Capacity reduction, either through vessel buyback or license retirement, is becoming an increasingly common response to the problems caused by overcapitalization. To have significant success, access to the fishery in question must be limited or restricted; buybackslretirements are not a realistic option in fisheries that are open to new entrants. Such limited entry may cause resentment after a depleted fishery has recovered and is once more economically profitable. If a controlled fishery expansion is possible subsequent to recovery of a depleted fishery, priority on new entrants could be given to those fishermen displaced by the reduction program. However, care must be taken to limit the expansion of sustainable capacity since allowing new entrants can defeat the purpose of a buyback/retirement program, not to mention waste money. Capacity reduction might also be viewed as part of a transition from a structure that permitted unsustainable harvests to a more sustainable structure. This new structure implies smaller fishing fleets, less peak employment, and possibly changes in the location and nature of fishing communities. A major question is what role, if any, Congress might take, particularly with respect to anticipated transition costs including temporary economic assistance. It should be kept in mind that market processes -- including lack of harvest opportunities as well as price pressures due to competition with aquaculture and commercial catch from other regions -- can and may exert a more substantial impact on fishing capacity than a formal capacity reduction program might.48 The differences between capacity and effort have been mentioned earlier, but are of great importance and can be easily confused since both are hard to define. Ultimately what is often referred to as effort -- the combined effect of the number of days fished, nets hauled, hooks set, etc.-- finds expression in the mortality rate of a fish stock due to fishing. Capacity reduction schemes, unless they remove a substantial percentage of effort, will not reduce the fishing mortality rate and may have little measurable effect on the biological state of a fish stock, since vessels remaining might fish harder or longer. Capacity reduction is an inefficient way to manage fishing effort. Reduction in capacity may increase economic profitability for those remaining within a fishery, by concentrating harvest among fewer vessels, but capacity reduction does not assure recovery of a depleted stock because it does not necessarily reduce the total harvest. Although reduction in capacity from vessel buyback or license retirement may be identical, the localized effects on the fishing industry could be different. License retirement, unless it removes a substantial portion of the fishermen in a fishery, will not result in capacity reduction if the remaining vessels can be upgraded or replaced by larger vessels to fish harder and longer. Mandatory destruction of vessels purchased in a buyback scheme may prevent prices of vessels in nearby open access fisheries from dropping substantially, (i.e., maintain current values of past investments). If vessels are not destroyed, low vessel prices could promote entry into other marginal fisheries where access is not limited, or put less-expensive equipment on the market for use in upgrading vessels within a limited access fishery, effectively increasing capacity. Conversely, if destruction of vessels should increase the price paid for vessels in a buyback, fewer vessels may be purchased and sellers may acquire sufficient capital to purchase more efficient vessels for use in other fisheries. Since resale of purchased vessels into other fisheries has been shown to be expensive to administer, it has largely been abandoned as an option. Resale prices are generally very low, 49 and resale merely relocates or exports the problem of overcapacity to other fisheries. This problem has been highlighted by developmental and environmental non-governmental organizations, who especially seek to prevent overcapacity problems from being relocated to less-developed nations, where managers may have even less expertise to deal with overcapacity concerns. Mandatory destruction of purchased vessels is not popular among suppliers of fishing equipment, as experience has demonstrated development of a substantial market for secondhand deck and wheelhouse equipment. However, the value of such sales will be taken into consideration by prospective sellers when furnishing bids, giving those paying for the buyback greater value for money. The regulated sale of vessels for non-fishing purposes, such as research, may allow purchase by non-profit organizations that could not otherwise have been afforded. However, care must be taken to assure that such vessels do not inadvertently find their way back into some fishery, either in the United States or abroad. Experience shows that direct sales between vendor and purchaser are much more cost effective than via the buyback authority. The mandatory destruction of vessels raises strong emotion in many, but also presents a feeling of fait accompli among those remaining in the fishery. The perception that problems caused by overcapacity are being addressed directly may help in securing support for additional recovery measures, such as quota or gear restrictions, or seasonal closures. Although by no means unanimous, support from the fishing industry for mandatory destruction, or permanent withdrawal from the fishing register, is widespread. While potentially offering greater capacity reduction per dollar (i.e., a license generally costs less than a vessel), license retirement is more likely to export the problems of overcapacity to other fisheries since the ability to fish is less damaged by surrendering one's license than one's vessel. Indeed, buybacks, without a wide application of limited access, are unlikely to be successful in reducing, rather than merely relocating, overcapacity problems. As alternative open-access fisheries become more scarce, this will become less of a problem, but the ultimate extension will likely be that vessels without licenses will become progressively less valuable, and vendors will seek to be paid more for their licenses, eventually approaching vessel buyback prices. Schemes that have achieved their aims of restoring profitability or allowing stock recovery have one common thread -- the relatively high proportion of the capacity removed (whether active or not) from the fishery. The successful buyback of 25% of the Norwegian seine fleet and 57% of the Australian northern prawn fishery capacity units are in marked contrast to reductions achieved in some of the earlier North American schemes. Although apparently high percentages of licenses were removed in many of these, multiple license holdings and latent capacity meant that little effort reduction was achieved. As active capacity was withdrawn, many fishermen that had accepted buyback finance re-entered the fishery through purchase of licenses from inactive vessels. In some cases, the premium paid for buyback vessels even helped their replacement by more efficient vessels, increasing the problems of overcapacity rather than reducing it. Some have recognized latent capacity as a serious problem. Speculative participation in a fishery escalates when limited access management is first acknowledged as possible. 50 On the other hand, latent capacity may provide the alternatives and flexibility that fishermen need to succeed in a very volatile and uncertain industry. The dual buyback of both active and inactive capacity, as intended by the FCRI in New England, is one approach to solving this. An annual renewal fee may be sufficient to deter some individuals from maintaining their eligibility, but as access to fisheries becomes progressively more difficult, licenses will be seen as being more and more desirable and the fees may need to be quite high to cause significant attrition. Requiring license use (i.e., verified catch history) for its renewal or a sizeable annual license renewal fee could reduce latent capacity. However, if the license is viewed as being of potential value, such a requirement might actually increase effort within the fishery, as vessels enter it for the minimum time period required to maintain license eligibility or cover the fee. An understanding of the forces within a particular fishery is needed to formulate a capacity reduction scheme where significant latent capacity exists. Experience indicates that any scheme which does not address the latent capacity problem will either fail or require a great deal of financing over a long enough period to mobilize all of the latent capacity. Another well-documented aspect of the latent capacity problem that reduces the success of capacity reduction schemes is a subsequent increase in effort or capacity of those vessels remaining in the fishery (i.e., capital stuffing, or mobilizing underutilized capacity). Such an increase has been the aim of certain schemes, in fisheries where economic issues were of primary concern, and where stock depletion has been prevented or minimized by other management measures. However, in other cases, increases in effort or capacity of individual vessels have canceled any of the perceived benefits of the buyback. The experiences of British Columbia in the 1970s and 1980s show the difficulties in preventing upgrading of vessel capacity within a fishery. The use of some sort of capacity units is an attempt to resolve this problem. The United Kingdom's scheme, going a step further and imposing a 10% unit penalty when licenses are "stacked," responds to the generally greater efficiency of newer vessels. Technological improvements are such that even in fisheries with no latent capacity and where license transfer to larger or more powerful vessels is forbidden, catching power of individual vessels will increase over time. A detailed study in the Oregon bottom trawl fishery estimated a 2% annual increase,51 close to the estimate of 2% to 4% by a fishermen's federation in the United Kingdom with respect to the North Sea trawl fleet.52 Figures such as these suggest that current buyback schemes within the United States will not be sufficient in themselves to correct the problems caused by years of overcapitalization. While lessons from the past have been learned, capacity reduction schemes will probably not succeed if they are not of sufficient magnitude. It may be easier during times of fiscal restraint to suggest schemes of limited scope, but underfunded capacity reduction programs have been shown repeatedly to act as little more than subsidies that encourage further overcapitalization. Latent capacity and/or capital stuffing can easily negate the achievements of a modest capacity reduction program. A review of Canadian experiences,53 extending as far back as 1969, has shown how short-term political reasons prevented sufficient reduction in the Canadian Atlantic fleets to sustain profitability as well as any reduction in total allowable catch to achieve sustainable harvests, even though this was recognized at the time. The short-term effect was to maintain employment in the fisheries at unsustainably high levels, at substantial cost to the taxpayers. The long-term effects are now known the world over: complete closure of several once-prolific fisheries and C$1.9 billion of government money to prevent economic collapse of the affected coastal regions. A valuable natural resource has, in effect, been a considerable drain on government funds for the last 20 years, instead of a productive asset. Even now, despite these lessons, funds for license retirement continue to be diverted, and it is widely accepted that capacity will still be greater than the fully recovered resource can profitably sustain. Admitting that jobs may be lost, often in areas that can ill afford it and in communities where fishing is a way of life, is painful and has been repeatedly avoided. Alternative fisheries in which to deploy vessels retiring from overcapitalized fleets are becoming increasingly rare. However, fishery managers do have a choice in how to affect the spectrum of vessels within a fishery. What appears to have been lacking are clear objectives or priorities for managers for influencing the size and structure of the fishing fleet. The formulation of such objectives or priorities could seek to incorporate the views of all stakeholders in the fishery, involving them in sharing the responsibility for managing this resource. Alternative decisions on how to distribute capacity reduction among different gear types within a fishery could result in very different effects on local employment in the fishing industry and fishing community economies. Regulations within a fishery may be used to optimize whatever asset of that particular fishery is valued most. In areas where numerous small communities depend on traditional fisheries, a buyback scheme and subsequent management measures could be tailored to remove the most highly capitalized vessels (those that provide the smallest number of jobs for the amount of fish they land). In other areas, where economic returns from the resource are viewed as being of chief importance, buyback and license-stacking regulations could encourage rationalization in favor of a few highly capitalized and efficient factory ships. However, defining objectives for individual fisheries that managers can then strive to achieve is a political decision that affects a wide array of interested parties (e.g., fishermen, coastal community businesses, large fishing companies, processors, scientists, managers). The closure of fisheries that have a tradition of open access is bound to cause some controversy and ill feeling among those who are excluded, especially when (or if) there are significant economic returns for those holding licenses. Some argue that vessels with the privilege of access should compensate those denied this privilege. In places where closure of fisheries to new entrants is particularly controversial, license fees of some sort might not only pay for enforcement costs within the fishery but could also be used in retraining or job creation schemes within the communities traditionally supported by the fishery. The economic difficulties faced by many fishing fleets within the United States are such that few could currently afford to finance a capacity reduction scheme from within. However, subsequent economic recovery of the fleet may be sufficient to allow annual license fees that could repay at least some of the cost of the capacity reduction scheme. Whether such fees would be politically acceptable is another matter. Gear retirement has been infrequently discussed and little used, but does offer the potential to stabilize employment within some fisheries, while reducing incidental bycatch within the fishery and damage to the environment. Critics, however, see any restrictions on gear choice to be regulation by inefficiency, forcing the fishing industry to operate with less profitability and in a fashion that is less than economically optimal. Many labor-intensive methods of fishing (e.g., targeting larger individuals within a species) have lost favor as technology has improved. Gear retirement and subsequent banning of certain types of gear may allow (or force) a fishery to change to more sustainable methods, that in the long term may prove to use the fishery resource more efficiently.54 The recent move to ban dragging for lobsters in New England is an example of restrictions on efficient gear for the individual in favor of greater societal efficiency. Such restrictions may, however, impose costs and inefficiencies that will be distributed among various segments of society, and should, therefore, be identified and assessed prior to their implementation. A harpoon fishery for swordfish on the Atlantic coast, that targeted only older, larger individuals, has existed for many years. It appeared to be sustainable as it was relatively labor-intensive, required little capital, and allowed individual swordfish to spawn several times before they were susceptible to capture. The development of a longline fishery, that captured not only the larger fish but many juveniles that had not reached sexual maturity, caused the harpoon fishery to become uneconomic, and it has almost died out. Some argue that this experience indicates a need for greater use of social and economic studies in decision-making, and that managers exert reasoned control over what types of gear might be legally fished. In another example, scallop dredges have been shown to kill a large number of juvenile scallops as well as causing considerable damage to other seabed fauna. Shallow waters, however, make possible a dive fishery in which juvenile mortality and seabed damage is non-existent. The larger individuals targeted have not only had a chance to spawn, but also command higher prices due to their perceived higher quality. Buying scallop dredges and subsequently banning dredging from certain areas could increase long-term revenues and employment in the fishery. A full accounting of the relative costs of such gear decisions would also include the differential risk to the fishermen's health and safety, effects on total market supply of the product, effects on the per-unit costs of harvesting, resulting market price to the consumer, and other factors. Fishermen are adept at circumventing regulations designed to limit their catches, and are often loath to change fishing methods that they have developed and practiced over a number of years. Unilateral implementation of gear restrictions may cause both resentment and economic difficulties in what are often already hard-pressed fisheries. The 1995 gillnet buyback in Florida is an example of some of the problems that may be encountered, and policing of unpopular gear restrictions can be expensive and time consuming. Gear retirement may be a way of reducing these problems, and allowing fishermen to finance more sustainable methods of fishing they could not otherwise have afforded to turn to. Thus, gear retirement could play a beneficial role in helping fisheries return to profitability and sustainability. Restricted Access Fisheries in the United States The following fisheries are considered to be currently under some form of limited entry or controlled access. Fisheries for which there is a complete closure or moratorium in federal waters (e.g., wealdish, Atlantic striped bass, Atlantic salmon) are not considered to be under limited entry or controlled access, since there is essentially no access at all. While a few of these fisheries have structured systems of limited access (e.g., individual transferable quota systems), others have minimal restrictions, such as income qualification for permits. Note also that, while the following list generally equates to fishery management plans (FMPs), some fisheries have been broken out (e.g., Atlantic surf clams and ocean quahogs) to highlight separate fisheries contained in a single FMP. American lobster ENDNOTES 37 For further details, see footnote 16, and Final Summary Report, Oregon Columbia River Gillnet Salmon Fleet Reduction Program, 1983-86 Portland, OR: Oregon Dept. of Fish and WildLife, 1987. 38 Sohappy V. Smith, 302 F.Supp. 899, D. Oregon. 39 Although many in Oregon have consistently opposed compensation schemes such as vessel buyout and license retirement, Oregon chose to participate since federal funding was available and Washington state residents were benefitting from the program. This opposition to compensation schemes may explain why Oregon later opted to fund research and habitat rehabilitation in its participation in the Northwest Emergency Assistance Plan, rather than a compensation program such as Washington state implemented. 40 For further details, see Schelle, K., and B. Muse. Buyback of Fishing Rights in the US and Canada: Implications for Alaska, 114th Annual Meeting of the American Fisheries Society, 1986, New York; and Jelvik, Mary L. 1986 Annual Report, Washington Dept of Fisheries Commercial Fishing Fleet Adjustment Program,Washington Dept. of Fisheries, Olympia, WA. 1987. 41 Although it appears that some of these were removed by natural attrition. 42 As defined in 59 Federal register No. 172 (Sept. 7, 1994): 46224-46232. 43 Washington Dept. of Fish and Wildlife. Northwest Emerges:y Assistance Plan: Vessel Peimit Buy Out Program. Final Report. Financial Assistance Award #NA57F1O164. Seattle, WA: August 1995. 44 61 Federal Register No.212 (Oct.31, 1996): 56217-56221. 45 Gislason, Gordon. Fishing for Answers: Coastal Communities amd the BC Salmon Fishery. Initial report prepared for the British Columbia Job Protection Commission by the ARA Consulting Group, Inc., Vancouver, BC, July 8, 1996. 25 p. 46 The ARA Consulting Group, Inc. Fishing for Answers: Coastal Communities and the BC Salmon Fishery -- Report Addendum. Prepared for the British Columbia Job Protection Commission, Vancouver, BC, August 12, 1996.4 p. 47 For example, cases have been filed concerning whether or not the ban is constitutional, how to measure shrimp trawl size, whether certain counties should be exempt from the ban, the legality of using small trawis to catch baitfish and jellylish, whether use of nets constructed from tarpaulin material is legal, and fraudulent net sewing to qualify for compensation. 48 This has been particularly evident with salmon fisheries in California, Oregon, and Washington. 49 Due to specialized equipment or unique vessel configuration that may not be easily convertible for use in another fishery, or simply the advanced age of the vessel. 50 In addition to speculative buying of licenses, those already in a fishery may engage in strategic behavior to establish a significant catch history within the likely qualifying period. Such behavior may be engaged in by former, but recently inactive, participants as a way to capture a share of the anticipated windfall profits associated with many limited access programs. Such behaviors have been justified as providing compensation for individuals who participated in pioneering such a fishery. Speculative investors typically see themselves as savvy capitalists who seized upon an opportunity. 51 Smith, C., and S. Hanna. "Measuring Fleet Capacity and Capacity Utilization."Can. J. Fish. Aquot. Sci.,47 (1990): 2085-2091. 52 Great Britain. Parliament. House of Lords. Select Committee on the Common Fisheries Policy of the European Union. Report. Her Majesties Stationary Office, 1994. 53 Shrank, William. "Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction: Origins of the Current Crisis in Atlantic Canada's Fisheries." Marine Policy, v.19 (1995): 285-299. 54 "Efficient" can mean different things to different people. For an individual skipper, gear that allows maximum capture of a resource in the shortest time is most efficient. For society, however, gear that maximizes sustainable returns in the long-term may be more socially efficient.
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