The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which legislatively approved the United States' membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), also contains provisions setting out the legislative procedure for revoking such approval, potentially leading to the withdrawal of the United States from the WTO. This report sets out the functional timetable and requirements for taking legislative action for United States withdrawal from the WTO.

The Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA; P.L. 103-465) in Section 101 (19 U.S.C. 3511) authorized the acceptance, by the President, of United States membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, thereby, of the rights and obligations of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) with its annexed specialized multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements ⁽¹⁾. The URAA, on the other hand, also contains provisions spelling out the legislative procedure whereby the statutory approval of the United States' membership in the WTO can be withdrawn.

The statute functionally ties the withdrawal of the United States from WTO membership to the requirement of periodic reports by the Executive to the Congress on the operation of the WTO and its effects on the United States.

Section 124 of the URAA (19 U.S.C. 3534) requires the U.S. Trade Representative to submit to the Congress, by March 1 of each year, beginning in 1996, a report on a wide range of WTO activities and administrative aspects of WTO operations during the preceding WTO fiscal year (which is the calendar year).

Moreover, as required by Section 125 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2535), beginning with March 1, 2000, and every five years thereafter, such report, submitted by the President, must "include an analysis of the effects of the WTO Agreement on the interests of the United States, the costs and benefits to the United States of its participation in the WTO, and the value of the continued participation of the United States in the WTO."

Following the submission of such quinquennial report, Congress can withdraw its approval of the WTO Agreement and, with it, of the United States' participation in the WTO, through the enactment of a joint resolution disapproving the original approval of the WTO Agreement. The reasons for the disapproval provision are explained by the House Ways and Means Committee on p. 35 of its report on the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (H.R. 5110; H.Rept. 103-826, Part 1) ⁽²⁾:

The purpose of this provision is to provide an opportunity for the Congress to evaluate the transition of the GATT to the WTO and to assess periodically whether continued membership in this organization is in the best interest of the United States. It is the desire of the Committee not to leave this decision totally in the hands of the Executive Branch but to be active in determining whether the WTO is an effective organization for achieving common trade goals and principles and for settling trade disputes among sovereign nations.

In the course of the five-year review, individual members of Congress can evaluate whether the WTO remains on course as a trade-oriented organization and has not expanded its activities to non-trade related areas. Congress wants to ensure that the United States can continue to exercise substantial influence within the WTO and successfully promote goals that benefit American producers, workers and consumers.

The provision was added to the original draft of the measure in the Trade Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means prior to its introduction. Since the bill implementing the WTO Agreement was to be considered under the fast-track procedure and, hence, could not be amended once introduced, any changes to it had to be made before its formal introduction in mock mark-ups in the relevant committees with both congressional and executive participation.

The legislation lays out the procedure to be followed by Congress in the consideration of the withdrawal measure. This procedure follows, in the main, the special abbreviated fast-track procedure for the consideration of "resolutions disapproving certain actions" (Section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended; 19 U.S.C. 2192) ⁽³⁾, but has been modified with respect to the timetable for certain legislative steps by the provisions of Section 125 itself. The provisions of both Section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 125 of the URAA are specifically defined as exercises of the rulemaking power of either House and deemed a part of the rules of either House. They can be changed by either House, with respect to its own procedure, at any time in the same manner and to the same extent as any other rule of that House (Section 151(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, applied to the procedure by Section 152 of the same Act; and Section 125(d) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act; 19 U.S.C. 2191(a), 2192, and 3535(d)).

In the presentation that follows, consequently, statutory references to Section 125 refer to that section of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 3535), while those to Section 152 refer to that section of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192).

Functionally, the timetable for legislative consideration of the joint resolution of disapproval encompasses the following steps:

(1) Introduction of a joint resolution of withdrawal.

A joint resolution of withdrawal may be introduced in either House by any member of that House (Sec. 125(c)(2)(A); 19 U.S.C. 3535(c)(2)(A)) within 90 days ⁽⁴⁾ of the date on which the Congress receives the President's quinquennial report ⁽⁵⁾ on the operation of the WTO (Sec. 125(b)(2)(B); 19 U.S.C. 3535(b)(2)(B)).

(2) Language of the withdrawal resolution.

The language of the joint resolution is prescribed by law (Sec. 125(c)(1); 19 U.S.C. 3535(c)(1)) to read, after the resolving clause, only as follows:

"That the Congress withdraws its approval, provided under section 101(a) of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, of the WTO Agreement as defined in section 2(9) of that Act."

(3) Committee referral.

The resolution is referred, in the House, to the Committee on Ways and Means and, in the Senate, to the Committee on Finance (Sec. 152(b); 19 U.S.C. 2192(b)).

(4) Committee consideration.

If the committee of either House to which the resolution has been referred has not reported it within 45 days ⁽⁶⁾ after its introduction, the committee is automatically discharged from further consideration of the resolution, and the resolution is placed on the appropriate calendar for floor consideration (Sec. 125(c)(2)(C); 19 U.S.C. 3535(c)(2)(C)).

(5) Floor consideration in the House.

(a) It is not in order to consider the joint resolution unless it has been reported by the Ways and Means Committee or that committee has been discharged (Sec. 125(c)(2)(D)(ii); 19 U.S.C. 3535(c)(2)(D)(ii)).

(Like all expedited procedures, this procedure can be superseded by the House's adoption of a resolution reported by the Rules Committee providing for a different procedure.)

(b) A motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution may only be made on the second legislative day after the calendar day on which the sponsor of the motion announces to the House his intention to do so (Sec. 125(c)(2)(E); 19 U.S.C. 3535(c)(2)(E)). The motion is highly privileged and nondebatable; no amendment to the motion, nor a motion to reconsider the vote by which it has been agreed or disagreed to, is in order (Sec. 152(d)(1); 19 U.S.C. 2192(d)(1)).

(c) Debate is limited to 20 hours, divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution; a motion further to limit debate is nondebatable; no amendment to the resolution, nor a motion to recommit it or to reconsider the vote by which it has been agreed or disagreed to, is in order (Sec. 152(d)(2); 19 U.S.C. 2192(d)(2)).

(d) Motions to postpone the consideration of the resolution and motions to proceed to the consideration of other business are decided without debate (Sec. 152(d)(3); 19 U.S.C. 2192(d)(3)).

(e) All appeals from the decisions of the Chair regarding the application of the Rules of the House of Representatives relating to the resolution are decided without debate (Sec. 152(d)(4); 19 U.S.C. 2192(d)(4)).

(f) Except as provided in the preceding provisions (a) - (e), consideration of the resolution is governed by the Rules of the House of Representatives applicable to other measures in similar circumstances (Sec. 152(d)(5); 19 U.S.C. 2192(d)(5)).

(6) Procedure in the Senate.

(a) A joint resolution of disapproval (withdrawal) that has passed the House is, upon receipt by the Senate, referred to the Committee on Finance (Sec. 152(f)(1)(A)(i); 19 U.S.C. 2192(f)(1)(A)(i)).

(b) If a joint resolution was introduced in the Senate before receipt of the resolution passed by the House, the House resolution is placed on the Senate calendar, but the Senate considers its own resolution, except that the Senate vote on the passage of the resolution is on the House resolution (Sec. 152(f)(1)(A)(ii); 19 U.S.C. 2192(f)(1)(A)(ii)).

(c) If the Senate passes a joint resolution of withdrawal before receiving the passed House resolution, its resolution is held at the desk pending the receipt of the House resolution. Upon receipt of the House resolution, the latter is deemed to have been read twice, is considered, read the third time, and passed (Sec. 152(f)(1)(B); 19 U.S.C. 2192(f)(1)(B)).

(This procedure makes it clear that a resolution of withdrawal cannot be adopted unless it is a House joint resolution.)

(7) Floor consideration in the Senate.

(a) A motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is privileged; an amendment to the motion is not in order, nor is a motion to reconsider the vote on the motion to proceed, whether agreed or disagreed to (Sec. 152(e)(1); 19 U.S.C. 2192(e)(1)).

(b) Debate on the joint resolution and all debatable motions and appeals connected therewith is limited to 20 hours, equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader, or their designees (Sec. 152(e)(2); 19 U.S.C. 2192(e)(2)); a motion to further limit debate is not debatable, and a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order (Sec. 151(g)(4); 19 U.S.C. 2191(g)(4).

(c) Debate on any debatable motion or appeal is limited to one hour, equally divided between, and controlled by, its mover and the manager of the resolution, except that when the manager is in favor of such motion or appeal, the time in opposition is controlled by the minority leader or his designee. Such leaders, or either of them, may, from time under their control on the passage of the resolution, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any debatable motion or appeal (Sec. 152(e)(3); 19 U.S.C. 2192(e)(3)).

(d) A motion to further limit debate on the resolution, on a debatable motion, or on an appeal is nondebatable; and no amendment to, or motion to recommit, the resolution is in order (Sec. 152(e)(4); 19 U.S.C. 2192(e)(4)).

(8) Restriction on consideration in either House.

It is not in order in either House to consider a joint resolution of withdrawal (other than a resolution received from the other House) if that House has previously adopted a joint resolution of withdrawal (Sec. 125(c)(3); 19 U.S.C. 2192(c)(3)).

(9) Deadline for congressional consideration.

The Congress is to adopt the joint resolution of withdrawal and transmit it to the President within 90 days ⁽⁷⁾ from the receipt of the President's quinquennial report (Sec. 125(b)(2)(i); 19 U.S.C. 3535(b)(2)(i)).

(10) Override of the veto.

If the President vetoes the joint resolution, each House votes to override the veto either by the last day of the 90-day period beginning on the date the Congress receives the President's report, or the last day of the 15-day period ⁽⁸⁾ beginning on the date the Congress receives the veto message, whichever is later (Sec. 125(b)(2)(A)(ii); 19 U.S.C. 3535(b)(2)(A)(ii)). In the Senate, consideration of a veto message, including consideration of any debatable motions and appeals related thereto, is limited to ten hours, equally divided between, and controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader, or their designees (Sec. 152(f)(3); 19 U.S.C. (f)(3)). ⁽⁹⁾

(11) Implementing the withdrawal.

The withdrawal of a member from the WTO is regulated by Article XV of the WTO Agreement. The provision requires the transmission of a written notice of withdrawal by the withdrawing member to the Director-General of the WTO, which takes effect six months after the date of its receipt and applies to the WTO Agreement and all related multilateral trade agreements; withdrawal from plurilateral agreements acceded to by the withdrawing member is controlled by the specific provisions of such agreements. Thus, the withdrawal from the plurilateral Agreement on Government Procurement under its Article 10 takes effect 60 days after the receipt of written notice of withdrawal by the Director-General of the WTO; and the withdrawal from the Agreement on Civilian Aircraft under its Article 9.6, 12 months from the receipt of the written notice.

As to the actual implementation of the withdrawal: Section 125 contains no specific provisions regarding the resolution's entry into effect, nor a directive (presumably to the President) to transmit the notice of withdrawal to the Director-General, nor the deadline for such transmittal, nor does it address the time-lag between the entry into effect of the resolution (on the date of its enactment or veto override) and the effective date of withdrawal of the United States from the WTO (six months after the transmittal of the withdrawal notice).

For current status of legislation to withdraw the Congress's approval of the WTO Agreement (H.J.Res. 90), visit http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra104.html.

Footnotes

1. ^(back)Multilateral trade agreements (MTAs)are agreements to which a government automatically becomes a party by accepting membership in the WTO and, hence, apply to all WTO members. Plurilateral trade agreements (PTAs) apply only between WTO members that specifically accede to them. At present, there are only two PTAs: Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, and Agreement on Government Procurement, both acceded to by the United States.

2. ^(back)There was no Senate report on the measure.

3. ^(back)This is the procedure used basically for enacting joint resolutions to disapprove presidential determinations that a nonmarket-economy country is not in violation of the free-emigration requirements of the Jackson-Vanik amendment (Sec. 402(b), Trade Act of 1974; 19 U.S.C. 2192(b)).

4. ^(back)The 90-day period excludes any day on which either House is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain, or sine die, and any Saturday and Sunday on which either House is not in session (Sec. 125(b)(2)(B) by reference to Sec. 154(b) (19 U.S.C. 2194(b)).

5. ^(back)There appears to be a technical inconsistency between this provision's reference to a President's report and Section 124--specifically referred to in Section 125--which requires annual reports on the WTO, of which the quinquennial one is more comprehensive, to be submitted by the U.S. Trade Representative.

6. ^(back)Computed as in footnote 4.

7. ^(back)Computed as in footnote 4.

8. ^(back)Both periods computed as in footnote 4.

9. ^(back)Under the Rules of the House of Representatives, the debate on overriding a Presidential veto is normally limited to one hour.