IB97030: Amtrak: Background and Selected Public Policy Issues II

CONTENTS FOR THIS SECTION

• Pro and Con Rationales For Federal Aid to Amtrak
• Rationales for Continuing Federal Aid to Amtrak
• Rationales for Discontinuing Federal Aid to Amtrak
• Possible Legislative Issues
• Continuation of Service if Amtrak Enters Bankruptcy
• Federal Outlays if Amtrak Enters Bankruptcy
• Alternatives for Intercity Rail Passenger Service
• Procedures for Resolving Amtrak Labor Disputes
• Collective Bargaining Agreements
• LEGISLATION
• CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
• FOR ADDITIONAL READING
• CRS Reports

Pro and Con Rationales For Federal Aid to Amtrak

Presented next are rationales supporting continued federal financial support for Amtrak, followed by rationales opposing such assistance. For ease of comparison, the rationales are numbered and each opposing rationale carries the same number as the rationale supporting continued federal financial assistance.

Rationales for Continuing Federal Aid to Amtrak

Some take the position that:

1. Amtrak conserves fuel and reduces air pollution, compared to alternative modes of intercity passenger travel. Between Washington, DC, and New Haven, CT, Amtrak operates electric Amtrak trains, avoiding the consumption of diesel fuel altogether.

2. Amtrak reduces the increasingly serious traffic congestion on the Northeast Corridor and, in major cities along the route, Amtrak reduces parking problems.

3. Amtrak provides a balanced transportation system that complements other modes of transportation. With or without Amtrak, the government may decide to devise strategies to

alleviate congestion along the Northeast Corridor that is most severe surrounding New York City, including levying congestion fees to move traffic to less congested times of day and encourage use of transit, building new roads, and expanding current airports or building new ones, among others. In the absence of Amtrak service, the possible need for such measures might seem more apparent.

Table 1. Intercity Passenger Costs Paid by Users

^a For Amtrak, this is the right-of-way it owns, i.e., the Northeast Corridor, and payments for use of freight rail track and facilities elsewhere on Amtrak routes. For autos and buses, it is the cost of purchasing right-of-way and constructing and maintaining highways. For airlines, it is the cost of airports and airways including the air traffic control system.

^b Funds into the Highway Trust Fund have generally exceeded total federal highway expenditures in recent years; and until recently, highway users were paying 4.3 cents user fee per gallon of highway fuel that went into the general fund of the U.S. treasury for deficit reduction.

^cThe Essential Air Services (EAS) program provides aid for commercial aviation that connects specified rural airports to an aviation hub; EAS is funded entirely from user fees on aviation users. About 80% of federal expenditures for airports and airways comes from user fees on aviation users.

4. Trucks and air carriers receive federal financial assistance, either directly or indirectly through the payment of user fees that may not pay for the full cost of providing facilities and services.

5. Amtrak provides convenient and generally reliable passenger transportation compared to other modes of transportation, especially in inclement weather. Its on-time performance

depends heavily upon freight railroads, but still compares favorably with highway transportation when highway lane closings and urban traffic congestion are considered.

6. Amtrak is popular and provides essential transportation to low-income, young, and elderly people, and to people who do not like to drive or fly.

7. Intercity rail passenger service cannot exist without federal financial assistance.

8. The cost of liquidating Amtrak would be as high as federal financial assistance to Amtrak for about 5 years, most of which would be for 6-year benefits for its employees and service on debt that Amtrak has incurred.

Rationales for Discontinuing Federal Aid to Amtrak

Some take the position that:

1. Intercity buses use only a third the energy per passenger mile that Amtrak uses. Autos are about as energy efficient as Amtrak for trips 70 miles or longer (at the average load factor of 2.19 for trips over 75 miles, the actual load factor experience of the United States as determined by the U.S. Department of Transportation in its National Personal Transportation Survey) and most Amtrak trips are 70 miles or longer. (More information

Table 2. Federal Aid to Intercity Rail Passenger Service
(in millions of dollars)

Note: Details might not equal totals due to rounding.

^a The number includes Amtrak contributions of about $142 million per year into a rail-industry-wide fund for benefits paid out to retired freight rail employees. The payment is a result of having a uniform, rail-industry-wide employee retirement contribution rate, set in federal law, that all rail employers must pay. One alternative would be to set Amtrak's rate on an actuarial basis. Another alternative would be to allow Amtrak to establish its own retirement program, as most employers outside the rail industry are allowed to do.

b Railroad retirement contributions are not shown separately.

^c The $1.092 billion is half of the amount provided to Amtrak over 2 years by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, P.L. 105-34, minus $11.615 million to each of the following non-Amtrak states in FY1998, also provided by P.L. 105-134: Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming.

^d The $238 million for the Northeast Corridor and $12 million for Penn Station NYC add to $250 million.

^e $7.118 million of this $19.2 million was to come from the Highway Trust Fund.

^f RSPA stands for the U.S. Department of Transportation, Research and Special Programs Administration.

^g Funds for the $100 million Penn Station NYC upgrade are not shown separately before FY1998.

^h The funds are contingent upon Rhode Island giving at least an equivalent benefit to Amtrak.

ⁱ The $12.0 million was for Amtrak "debt transactions".

^j The $3.5 million was for the "Amtrak Corridor" in Illinois.

Source: Years except 1996, 1997, and 1998: U.S. Government, Budget of the United States Government, various years; FY1996: P.L. 104-50, November 15, 1995, 109 Stat. 436; FY 1997: P.L. 104-205 and P.L. 104-208.; FY1998: P.L. 105-66 (H.R. 2169).

Table 3. FY1999 Federal Aid
(in millions of dollars)

Note: Details might not equal totals due to rounding.

Note: The dash (-) means no action has yet been taken.

Note: The Administration requests that Amtrak funding come from the Highway Trust Fund. The House and Senate committees recommend that funding for Amtrak come from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury.

a Not shown separately.

^b The $200 million, $12 million, and $500,000 are to come from the $621 million.

^c The Senate Committee report suggested that $200 million of the $555 million go for the Northeast Corridor.

^d $1.092 billion is half of the 2-year amount from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34), minus $11.615 million to each of the following non-Amtrak states in FY1998, also provided by P.L. 105-134: Alaska, Hawaii, Maine, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming.

^e Funding for the Penn Station NYC is provided by the Transportation Equity Act for the 21^st Century (TEA 21) (P.L. 105-178). Funds are to come from the Highway Trust Fund.

^f The $450,000 appropriation is rounded up to $0.5 million.

^g TEA 21 (in section 7201) authorizes to be appropriated $35 million for each of the following years: FY1999, FY2000, and FY2001.

^h The $15 million for Maglev (magnetically-levitated passenger systems) is provided by section 1218 of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21^st Century (TEA 21), P.L. 105-178; the funds are to come from the Highway Trust Fund, other than from the Transit Account therein. TEA 21 provides $20 million for FY2000 and $25 million for FY2001. Maglev now qualifies for federal Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement (CMAQ) funds according to quidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation.

ⁱ A supplemental appropriation contained in the omnibus appropriations bill for FY1999.

Source: U.S. Government, Budget of the United States Government, FY1999, and the laws cited in the column titles.

comparing fuel efficiency is contained in CRS Report 96-22 E; see For Additional Reading.) Airlines use more fuel than Amtrak. Electric trains themselves, before considering the generating plant producing the electricity and the losses in energy incurred in transmission over power lines to the trains, probably offset some of the energy efficiency of intercity buses and autos, and avoid the harmful emissions that come from consumption of gasoline and diesel fuel. But, the electricity is produced by coal-burning plants, nuclear power plants, and, in some cases, by hydroelectric power plants in Canada. Coal-burning power plants convert less than 40% of the energy in coal into electricity, and can contribute to acid rain that has damaged forests, rivers, and other ecosystems. Nuclear power plants create some waste products that are radioactive for thousands of years and that must be isolated from humans and the environment.

2. More direct and less costly solutions to traffic congestion and parking problems along the Northeast Corridor may be available. Some options are mentioned in point 3 above.

3. Amtrak takes passengers away from less costly forms of transportation. These other modes would seem to have the potential capacity to carry all of Amtrak's passengers, particularly if traffic management strategies were implemented.

4.Trucks do not transport intercity passengers, so they are not a relevant comparison. Intercity buses receive virtually no federal financial assistance. Autos pay at least their full share of the federal portion of road costs. Airlines receive no federal aid for covering operating losses and virtually no aid for equipment, except in a few markets where federal law requires them to serve. Airlines receive federal aid for airports and air traffic control services, but that aid is far less per passenger mile than Amtrak receives.

5. Auto, air, and intercity bus service seem to be the preferred mode of travel, compared to Amtrak, except when inclement weather precludes their use, which is infrequent and usually of short duration. Further, Amtrak's limited route structure and infrequency of service makes Amtrak an option for only a very small portion of passengers traveling during inclement weather. Amtrak's reliability is reduced when its generally poor on-time performance is considered; in contrast, auto and bus reliability is usually reduced only in some major urban centers during rush hours and by occasional route closures.

6. Amtrak generally is not heavily patronized other than between Washington, DC, and New York City, most intercity passengers preferring to travel by other modes. Amtrak serves 44 states; intercity buses serve all 50 states. Buses serve far more city pairs, and have more frequent schedules than Amtrak. Because intercity buses generally have lower fares, 4 times more passengers, and serve many times more rural communities compared to Amtrak, buses likely serve many more low-income, young, and elderly people, and people who are afraid of driving or flying, compared to Amtrak. Buses generally have softer seats than Amtrak, and some of them provide free movies.

7. Intercity rail passenger service might exist in several areas of the country without federal financial assistance if Amtrak's monopoly on providing such service were ended. These areas might include Washington, DC, to New York City; Los Angeles to San Diego; Portland to Seattle and Vancouver; Chicago to Milwaukee; and perhaps some other points, particularly in the Northeast. Alternatively, Congress could provide some financial assistance to such carriers, if needed, to assure service between selected points. Airlines, bus companies, freight railroads, and one or more states, among others, might be interested in providing intercity rail passenger service if the prospect of commercial success seems likely, or if sufficient federal, state, and/or other financial assistance were offered. The likelihood of commercial success might be enhanced, whether or not that service is provided by Amtrak, if the service provider were not subject to the arguably cost-raising Railway Labor Act, the Railroad Retirement Act, the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and the workers compensation law that applies only to railroads and their employees -- the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Any service provider presumably would be subject to rail safety laws. Current law prohibits anyone from providing intercity passenger service on a route served by Amtrak without permission from Amtrak.

8. The legislation creating Amtrak established Amtrak as a private-sector corporation, not a federal agency, incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia. The legislation makes no provision for the financial obligations of Amtrak to be guaranteed by the federal government. Rather, it creates a preferred status for Amtrak financial obligations to the federal government to be paid before other creditors. Thus, there is a strong possibility that the federal government would not be responsible for Amtrak financial obligations to creditors or its employees under current law. Congress could enact legislation providing compensation by the federal government to Amtrak creditors and employees.

Possible Legislative Issues

Legislative issues regarding Amtrak could arise quickly if Amtrak seeks legislation to help it eliminate its operating deficit or if, after December 2, 1999, the Amtrak Reform Council notifies Congress that the Council thinks Amtrak will require federal operating assistance after September 30, 2002. While an Amtrak bankruptcy appears unlikely during 1999, the issue could arise if Congress were to prevent Amtrak from "borrowing" federal funds intended for capital improvements to cover operating losses, as Amtrak has stated it intends to do. If an Amtrak bankruptcy appears imminent, the Amtrak Reform Council might be asked by Congress to propose an Amtrak restructuring plan on short notice. Some legislative alternatives Congress might consider to help Amtrak operate without federal operating aid could include possible changes in Amtrak's obligations under the Railroad Retirement Act, the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Railway Labor Act, and the Railroad Unemployment Act, among others. Information on these laws is contained in the CRS reports cited in For Additional Reading.

Continuation of Service if Amtrak Enters Bankruptcy

A March 1998 GAO report states that "Despite attempts to address growing losses, Amtrak's financial condition raises the specter of possible bankruptcy." (GAO/RCED-98-60, page 6.)

Railroads are not permitted to liquidate under chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. They may file to reorganize under subchapter IV of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code which specifically governs railroad reorganization. Among the features of subchapter IV are mandatory appointment of a trustee; participation as of right by the Interstate Commerce Commission [now the Surface Transportation Board], the Department of Transportation, and any State or local commission having regulatory jurisdiction over the debtor; and, judicial protection of the "public interest." Wages and working conditions of railroad employees may only be changed in accordance with provisions of the Railway Labor Act. If a reorganization plan is not confirmed within 5 years of the bankruptcy filing, the court may order liquidation of the railroad debtor. Alternatively, Congress could enact legislation mandating the liquidation of Amtrak or providing higher funding. Amtrak's heavy dependence on federal funds, notably to pay wages and salaries, could hasten liquidation.

The impact of an Amtrak bankruptcy might be particularly strong between Washington, DC, and New York City. Along this Corridor, Amtrak carries about half of all its passengers, and provides transit service for several metropolitan areas under contract with their transit authorities. Amtrak's other rail transit operations occur at Chicago, Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco.

If Amtrak were liquidated, transit authorities presumably would provide rail commuter service that is now provided for them by Amtrak under contract. If Amtrak were liquidated, preparations to provide interim intercity rail passenger service, say between Washington, DC, and New York City, might be made rather quickly if the need is urgent, perhaps with Conrail or one of its successors. The outcome could depend in part upon the willingness of the suppliers of Amtrak's equipment to let another operator use that equipment. They might not have other attractive alternatives for the equipment. The government might decide to identify an alternate provider and to have contractual contingency arrangements in place with that potential provider to begin interim intercity rail passenger service operations immediately in the event Amtrak is liquidated. If the potential service provider would require financial assistance, then the outcome might depend on that provider signing contracts with whichever governmental units, federal, state, and local, would be willing to provide that funding. Congress could remove the monopoly on intercity rail passenger service before an Amtrak liquidation, possibly resulting in potential service providers exploring early the possibility of providing service, with or without federal financial assistance, particularly between Washington, DC, and New York City, and in some other markets such as Los Angeles to San Diego.

In the absence of Amtrak, the private sector might provide intercity rail passenger service between Washington, DC, and New York City with several trains daily. Most other Amtrak routes are not heavily patronized, but some of those routes might support occasional and seasonal rail travel. This view is discussed under the second subheading below.

Robin Jeweler, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division, CRS, contributed to this section.

Federal Outlays if Amtrak Enters Bankruptcy

GAO takes the position that "the financial impacts associated with a possible [Amtrak] liquidation are difficult to estimate because of the uncertainties connected with the financial condition of the Corporation at the time of liquidation. These uncertainties are associated with different types of costs. These costs include, for example, (1) obligations that are due to creditors, such as lenders, vendors, and Amtrak employees; (2) costs that Amtrak currently pays, or might have to pay in the future, that could be assumed by other parties; and (3) costs to administer and close out the estate. Virtually all the costs associated with a liquidation would likely be borne either directly by those who do business with Amtrak or by those who benefit from Amtrak's existence. In this regard, most of these costs would represent Amtrak's existing financial obligations and the costs of providing future levels of rail service, which would be borne by other parties." (GAO/RCED-98-60, pages 7-8.)

The United States Comptroller General has stated that there is a substantial body of law to suggest that in the event of an Amtrak bankruptcy, Amtrak's financial obligations for displacement payments to its employees would not be a financial responsibility of the federal government under current law. (Source: H.Hrng. 105-9, p. 25, and updated by an opinion letter (number B-277814) from the General Counsel of GAO to Representative Kasich dated October 20, 1997.)

The GAO letter states that "The Department of Transportation agrees with our opinion that the United States would not be liable for Amtrak's labor protection obligations and other debts, as well as our other conclusions. We have presented Amtrak's views in our discussion." The letter states that the legislation creating Amtrak created a private entity, not an agency of the federal government, and made no provision for the financial obligations of Amtrak to be guaranteed by the federal government. Rather, it created a preferred status for Amtrak financial obligations to the federal government to be paid before other creditors.

Alternatives for Intercity Rail Passenger Service

Some believe Amtrak is the last remaining hope of having any intercity rail passenger service in the United States, while others believe that alternatives to Amtrak might be preferable. The first group believes that continuing federal financial assistance to Amtrak is justified by the benefits provided by Amtrak, as discussed above.

The second group believes that: (1) except for the route between Washington, DC, and New York City, passengers have abandoned intercity rail passenger service; (2) luxury, seasonal, and occasional sightseeing "land cruises" from metropolitan areas to resort areas and national parks, as well as to see the changes in season, the rugged western terrain, colorful leaves in the fall, and winter snows, would be provided by private-sector companies at no expense to taxpayers, as they do now on a limited scale; and (3) reliable, frequent, economical intercity rail passenger service can be provided (at no, or lower than current, expense to taxpayers) between Washington, DC, and New York City, and perhaps between certain other points such as Boston to New York City, San Diego to Los Angeles, Portland, Oregon to Vancouver, British Columbia, and Chicago to Milwaukee.

Some in both groups believe that railway labor laws unrelated to safety may raise the cost of providing intercity rail passenger service. Intercity buses and most other businesses that might be interested in providing intercity rail passenger service are not subject to those laws now. In that view, exempting intercity rail passenger service providers from those laws would improve considerably the prospects for providing the service without taxpayer support. Similarly, such providers would have a better chance of making a profit on intercity rail passenger service if they were not required to contribute to the retirement benefits of retired freight rail employees, as Amtrak is required to do.

Procedures for Resolving Amtrak Labor Disputes

Amtrak is covered by the Railway Labor Act. Under that Act, parties seeking to change the terms of pay, rules, or working conditions must negotiate under the auspices of the National Mediation Board until the Board determines that efforts to bring about a settlement are unsuccessful. During negotiations, and for 30 days after the Board releases the parties, the union may not strike and the rail carrier may not change pay and working conditions. 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1997).

If mediation has not settled the dispute, the National Mediation Board may notify the President that the dispute "threatens substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation service." The President may then establish an emergency board to investigate and report on the dispute. After creation of the Board, and for 30 days after its report, neither party may make any change in the conditions out of which the dispute arose. 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1997). This is known as the "cooling off" period.

Congress typically intervenes in rail work stoppages, particularly when a large number of commuters would be adversely affected, as might happen in a work stoppage at Amtrak. Congress has intervened in past rail freight work stoppages by imposing the emergency board recommendations on the parties, or by imposing mandatory arbitration on the parties. More information on presidential and congressional intervention in rail labor disputes is contained in CRS Report 97-1018 E cited in For Additional Reading.

The American Law Division of CRS contributed to the preceding section.

Collective Bargaining Agreements

Amtrak reached agreements with some of its 13 other unions based on the agreement it reached in 1997 with its Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees union. These settlements make a work stoppage seem unlikely for now. The agreements are expected to raise Amtrak's operating costs, and thus its operating losses that need to be covered by federal operating assistance.

The agreement with Amtrak's track workers occurred after the Presidential Emergency Board appointed by President Clinton on August 21, 1997, recommended a 3.5 % wage increase for track employees, retroactive to December 1, 1995, and another 3.5 % increase retroactive to July 1, 1997, and another 3.5 % increase on July 1, 1999, plus other increases. It also recommended that work rule changes proposed by labor be resolved by binding arbitration. Amtrak took the position that the wage increase would set a precedent for its 12 other unions, and that the increase in cost from all its employees would raise labor costs by $400 million annually and force it into bankruptcy. Nevertheless, on November 3, 1997, Amtrak signed a tentative collective bargaining agreement providing these benefits. The agreement allows Amtrak to withdraw from the agreement if Congress does not provide the funding to cover these benefits.

The collective bargaining agreement between Amtrak and its track employees on November 3, 1997, was reported to allow Amtrak to cancel that agreement unless Congress: (1) authorizes an additional $80 million to $170 million for FY1996 and FY1997; (2) authorizes an additional $100 million to $200 million over the next 2 years; and (3) provides both the $2.3 billion authorized by P.L. 105-34 and the $199 million authorized in P.L. 105-66. (P.L. 105-66 provided the $199 million only if the $2.3 billion were not provided. At the time P.L. 105-66 was enacted, Amtrak "reform" legislation had not been enacted, a prerequisite for Amtrak receiving the $2.3 billion.)

The American Law Division of CRS contributed to the preceding section.

LEGISLATION

P.L. 105-34 (H.R. 2014)
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Conference report is H.Rept. 105-220. The bill would have created a trust fund for Amtrak, but that provision was deleted in negotiations with the White House, and a provision (§ 977, at 111 Stat. 899) was added to allow Amtrak to receive $2.32 billion as a tax credit carry forward from losses the freight railroads had during the later years when they were required to operate intercity rail passenger service. This would count as a tax reduction even though the freight railroads would not benefit from the provision and, further, even though it would result in an outlay of federal funds. Signed into law August 7, 1997.

P.L. 105-134 (S. 738)
Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997. Selected provisions are summarized in CRS Report 97-1023 E cited in the For Further Reading section below. Signed into law December 2, 1997.

P.L. 105-277 (H.R. 4328)
Making Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999. Signed into law October 21, 1998.

CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. "Amtrak's Future and Passenger Rail Alternatives," Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations. Hearing March 24, 1998, 105^th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1999. pp. 197 - 323. (S.Hrg. 105-851)

---- Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 1999. Report to accompany S. 2307, 105^th Congress, 2nd Session. July 15, 1998. (S.Rept. 105-249)

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Amtrak Reform and Privatization Act of 1997. Report to accompany H.R. 2247, 105^th Congress, 1^st Session. September 17, 1997. Washington. 95 p. (H.Rept. 105-251)

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997. Report on S. 738, 105^th Congress, 1^st Session. September 24, 1997. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1997. 76 p. (S.Rept. 105-85)

FOR ADDITIONAL READING

U.S. Department of Transportation. Office of the Inspector General. "Amtrak financial Viability/Modernization," The Department of Transportation's 10 Top-Priority Management Issues. Statement of The Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation, Before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Transportation, U.S. Senate. [February 25, 1999.] pp. 17-18.

---- Summary Report on the Independent Assessment of Amtrak's Financial Needs through Fiscal Year 2002. Report Number TR-1999-027, November 23, 1998. 77 p.

U.S. General Accounting Office. "Highway, Transit, and Passenger Rail Challenges," Federal Management: Challenges Facing the Department of Transportation, GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-99-94. February 25, 1999. pp. 6-7.

---- Intercity Passenger Rail: Financial Performance of Amtrak's Routes. GAO/RCED-98-151. May 1998. 49 p.

---- Intercity Passenger Rail: Issues Associated With a Possible Amtrak Liquidation. GAO/RCED-98-60. March 1998. 32 p.

---- Intercity Passenger Rail: Prospects for Amtrak's Financial Viability. GAO/RCED-98-211R. June 5, 1998. 12 p.

---- Outlook for Improving Amtrak's Financial Health. GAO/T-RCED-98-134. March

24, 1998. 12 p.

---- Surface Infrastructure: High-Speed Rail Projects in the United States. GAO/RCED-99-44. January 1999. 53 p.

CRS Reports

CRS Report 96-22 E. Amtrak and Energy Conservation in Intercity Passenger Transportation, by Stephen J Thompson.

CRS Report 96-471 E. Amtrak Employee Benefits: Some Policy Considerations, by Stephen J Thompson.

CRS Report 95-1199 E. Amtrak: Federal Financial Assistance, by Stephen J Thompson.

CRS Report 96-180 E. Amtrak, Freight Rail, Commuter Rail, and the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA): Some Public Policy Considerations, by Stephen J Thompson.

CRS Report 97-1023 E. Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997: Selected Provisions and Later Developments, by Stephen J Thompson.

CRS Report 98-247 (pdf) E. Labor Issues in the 105^th Congress. The contribution on pages 48 and 49 addresses Amtrak labor legislation, and the contribution on pages 46 and 47 addresses strike procedures governing Amtrak.

CRS Report 97-1056 E. Rail and Air Carrier Labor Relations: Presidential and Congressional Intervention, 1980 Through 1989, by Stephen J Thompson.

CRS Report 97-1018 E. Rail and Air Carrier Labor Relations: Presidential and Congressional Intervention Since 1990, by Stephen J Thompson.