RL30234: The Pacific Salmon Treaty:
The 1999 Agreement  in Historical Perspective

Daniel A. Waldeck

Presidential Management Intern

and

Eugene H. Buck

Senior Analyst in Natural Resources Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Updated October 18, 1999

Summary

The Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST) of 1985 requires the United States and Canada to develop periodic bilateral agreements to implement the PST's conservation and harvest-sharing principles. Beginning in 1993, long-standing disputes prevented such an agreement from being concluded. On June 30, 1999, after many years of heated diplomatic struggles, U.S. and Canadian officials reached a new comprehensive agreement.

The new agreement (1) establishes abundance-based fishing regimes for the Pacific salmon fisheries under the jurisdiction of the PST; (2) creates two bilaterally-managed regional funds to promote cooperation, improve fishery management, and aid stock and habitat enhancement efforts; and (3) includes provisions to enhance bilateral cooperation, improve the scientific basis for salmon management, and apply institutional changes to the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC). This report provides historical background about the PST, discusses issues that created difficulties in the regime, and summarizes the new salmon accord.

The new conservation and harvest-sharing agreement is likely to be of interest to Congress for several reasons. Most notably, a congressional appropriation of$ 140 million will be required to establish the agreement's two restoration and enhancement funds. Also, implementation of provisions under the new agreement may require additional authorizing legislation or amendment of existing law. The new agreement under the PST regime will need to be implemented in accordance with existing laws pertaining to salmon conservation (e.g., Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act; Endangered Species Act). In addition, the agreement's implementation will affect the quantity offish available for commercial, recreational, and subsistence fisheries as well as Indian treaty allocations.

Historically, congressional interest in the PST has focused on the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985, which implements PST provisions and establishes the structure of the U.S. section of the PSC. The PST created an arrangement between the United States and Canada for cooperative management, research, and enhancement of Pacific salmon stocks. The goal of the PST was coordinated management of Pacific salmon throughout their range to ensure sustainable fisheries and maximize long-term benefits to both Parties. However, some salmon stocks continued to decline, interceptions (the harvest of one nation's fish by fishermen from another nation) strained diplomatic relations between the United States and Canada, and the Parties fundamentally disagreed on how to achieve the conservation and harvest-sharing goals established by the PST. Thus, the new agreement represents a major breakthrough in a longstanding contentious resource issue.

Contents
Introduction
Historical Background
        Fraser River Convention
The Pacific Salmon Treaty
The Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985, and U.S. Decision-Making
The 1999 Agreement
        Abundance-Based Management
        Fishery Regimes
                Transboundary Rivers
                Northern British Columbia and Southeast Alaska
                Chinook Salmon
                Fraser River Sockeye and Pink Salmon
                Coho Salmon
                Southern British Columbia and Washington State Chum Salmon
        Regional Bilateral Funds
        Renewed Cooperation on Scientific and Institutional Matters
        Habitat
Continuing Concerns

Introduction

On June 30, 1999, U.S. and Canadian officials signed a new comprehensive agreement to resolve long-standing disputes and to ensure implementation of the conservation and harvest-sharing principles of the Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST). After years of failed negotiations, recent studies, joint-fishery restrictions to protect wild salmon stocks, and the involvement of high-level government negotiators have helped to ease tensions between the United States and Canada over the shared harvest of Pacific salmon. Moreover, the two nations have recognized that failure to reach a long-term conservation and harvest-sharing agreement is in no one's best interest. This report provides historical background about the PST, discusses issues that created difficulties in the regime, and summarizes the new salmon accord.

The new agreement (1) establishes abundance-based fishing regimes for the Pacific salmon fisheries under the jurisdiction of the PST; (2) creates two bilaterally-managed regional funds to promote cooperation, improve fishery management, and aid stock and habitat enhancement efforts; and (3) includes provisions to enhance bilateral cooperation, improve the scientific basis for salmon management, and apply institutional changes to the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC).

Pacific salmon have long been a matter of common concern to the United States and Canada. In the 1800s, with the advent of canning technologies, extensive commercial salmon fisheries developed in both countries. Since their inception, salmon fisheries have experienced strong fluctuations in catch and stock abundance. Periods of great plenty were often followed by years of low returns. By the 20th Century, it had become obvious that the combined effects of fishing and natural variability in abundance could lead to overharvest. The United States and Canada recognized that some form of cooperation would be necessary for the sake of the resource.

For many years, piecemeal agreements were forged to protect specific fisheries, e.g., Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon.1 However, because of the diversity in salmon fisheries and recurring disagreements over how best to address the interception problem,2 these agreements proved inadequate. In 1985, the PST 3 created an arrangement for cooperative management, research, and enhancement 4 of all intercepted Pacific salmon stocks. The goal of the PST is coordinated management of Pacific salmon throughout their range to ensure sustainable fisheries and maximize long-term benefits to the Parties.

Despite the PST, some salmon stocks continued to decline.5 Interceptions strained diplomatic relations between the United States and Canada, and the Parties fundamentally disagreed on how to achieve the conservation and harvest-sharing goals established by the PST. Since the last long-term harvest agreement expired in 1992, Canada has argued strongly that the United States has exceeded its share of the catch under the PST's "benefits equivalent" provisions.6 In contrast, the United States, until recently,7 argued that Canadian interceptions of Pacific Northwest (Washington, Oregon, and Idaho) coho salmon and chinook salmon were further damaging these depleted stocks.8

In most years since 1992, a non-stated assumption that both nations would abide by conservation measures allowed the two countries to manage their fisheries. In 1997, bilateral stakeholder talks were held in an attempt to resolve the impasse. Ultimately, these negotiations failed to forge an agreement. In August 1997, the United States and Canada appointed William Ruckelshaus and David Strangway, respectively, to conduct a joint investigation and to make recommendations for ending the controversy. Recently, Washington state and Canada agreed to restrict several of their fisheries to help protect wild salmon stocks. However, failure to reach a long- term conservation and harvest-sharing agreement has harmed several salmon stocks and hampered the ability of Washington, Alaska, and British Columbia fishermen to plan fishing seasons and budget expenses because, without a harvest-sharing agreement, year-to-year salmon allocations have been unpredictable.9 Thus, the new agreement represents a major breakthrough in a longstanding contentious resource issue.

Historical Background ¹⁰

Pacific salmon are among the world's most highly migratory anadromous fish.11 They spawn in fresh water, often hundreds of miles from the ocean, migrate to the sea as juveniles, and then disperse into the open ocean. From one to several years later, they return to their natal rivers to spawn and complete their life cycle. Salmon migrate freely across the national boundaries of the United States and Canada and into international waters. Along the Pacific Coast of North America, many juvenile salmon travel north after they enter the ocean.

There are seven species 12 of anadromous Pacific salmon and trout: chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha), sockeye salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka), coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch), pink salmon (Oncorhynchus gorbuscha), chum salmon (Oncorhynchus keta), steelhead trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss), and searun cutthroat trout (Oncorhynchus clarki). Migration patterns widely vary among the species.13 Because of their value and importance to U.S. and Canadian fisheries, three species — chinook, sockeye, and coho — are of particular interest.14

As a result of these migration patterns, fishermen in the United States and Canada harvest (intercept) fish originating in and returning to rivers of the other country, often in substantial numbers.16 Canadian troll fisheries 17 off the west coast of Vancouver Island often catch large numbers of chinook and coho salmon bound for the rivers of Oregon and Washington, including some threatened and endangered stocks. The west coast of Vancouver Island troll and recreational fisheries also harvest Puget Sound chinook. Fishermen in southeast Alaska catch salmon that are returning to rivers in Canada and the Pacific Northwest. In some years, Washington state commercial fisheries, both tribal and non-tribal, may catch large numbers of Fraser River sockeye as they migrate through the Strait of Juan de Fuca. For many years, these interceptions have caused tension between the United States and Canada.

Fraser River Convention

An early success story in the management of shared salmon stocks was a 1937 arrangement between the United States and Canada to conserve and equitably divide the harvest of Fraser River sockeye salmon. The Fraser River lies wholly within Canada, but sockeye salmon generally pass through U.S. waters as they return to the Fraser to spawn. Thus, Fraser River sockeye supported large fisheries in both the United States and Canada, setting the stage for an international drama.

In the late 1800s, Canadian fishermen dominated the Fraser River sockeye fishery. By 1900, with the expansion of U.S. purse seine fisheries, U.S. harvest quickly surpassed the Canadian harvest. From 1900 through 1934, U.S. fisheries produced from 61% to 70% of the sockeye salmon canned from the Fraser River run.18 In 1913, crews blasting a railroad right-of-way through the canyon walls above the Fraser River triggered a massive rock slide that choked the river canyon.19 The effects of the slide were most detrimental at a narrow section of the river known as Hell's Gate, which blocked access to spawning areas upstream from the slide.20 United States and Canadian harvest of sockeye salmon dropped dramatically.21 By 1918, with substantial U.S. assistance, the Hell's Gate reach was restored, and sockeye salmon could again move upstream to spawn.

The rise of competing U. S. and Canadian fisheries, natural fluctuations in salmon stock abundance, and the events at Hell's Gate provided impetus for negotiations between the United States and Canada over the cooperative management of the sockeye salmon stocks. In 1937, after 7 years of negotiation,22 the Fraser River Convention 23 was ratified. The Convention established the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, with principal responsibility for protection, preservation, and extension of the sockeye salmon fisheries of the Fraser River (pink salmon were later added to the Convention).24 The Commission operated under two objectives: (1) restore Fraser River sockeye runs; and (2) equally divide the catch, within practical limits, between U.S. and Canadian fishermen.25 In 1946, the Commission recommended that regulations be implemented to:

• provide closures designed to permit adequate escapement of all races of salmon comprising the run;

• divide the total catch as equally as might be possible between the fishermen of the two countries; and

• permit the largest catch possible consistent with attainment of these objectives.26

However, because of the diversity in salmon fisheries and recurring disagreements over how best to address the interception problem, the 1937 agreement eventually proved inadequate.27 The Fraser River Convention was an ambitious experiment, which unquestionably met its twofold mandate to rebuild and equally allocate Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon. However, a much broader forum was necessary to solve the overall problem of U.S. and Canadian salmon interceptions. It would be nearly half a century before the two countries agreed to terminate the Fraser River Convention and replace it with an expanded institution.28

The Pacific Salmon Treaty

In 1985, after several decades and a great deal of international and regional deliberation, the United States and Canada successfully completed negotiations on the Pacific Salmon Treaty (PST).29 The PST created an arrangement for cooperative management, research, and enhancement of shared Pacific salmon stocks, to ensure sustainable fisheries and maximize long-term benefits to both Parties. In the absence of a fish-sharing arrangement, benefits derived from unilateral conservation and enhancement efforts are diminished by another nation's interceptions. The PST created a regime aimed at ensuring sustainable fisheries through conservation and enhancement, and optimizing benefits to each Party.

The PST established a PSC to make recommendations to the Parties concerning management of the salmon fishing regime. The PSC meets annually to review fishing activities in the previous year, to advise the PST Parties on the status of the fishery, and to suggest any necessary adjustments to the regime. The PSC is divided into two national sections, each with four Commissioners and four alternate Commissioners.30 Voting structure was defined for the United States by the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act, as discussed below.

The PST's fundamental principles are to: "a) prevent overfishing and provide for optimum production [of salmon]; and b) provide for each Party to receive benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters."31 In addition. Parties are to take into account the desirability of reducing interceptions, the desirability of avoiding disruption of existing fisheries, and annual variations in stock abundance. For many years, the Parties strongly disagreed over the meaning of benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters, as specified in Article III of the PST, most notably in terms of what "benefits" should be considered. Canada has stated that "benefits equivalent" should be interpreted strictly on a fish- for-fish basis. That is, either Canada harvests the salmon produced in its rivers or harvests an amount of U.S. fish equal to the number of Canadian salmon intercepted in U.S. fisheries.32 The United States has viewed this interpretation as an oversimplification, believing that all of the PST's principles must be considered in unison, and that there is no simple definition of "benefits equivalent." For example, who benefits when salmon are caught in Alaska but processed in Canada?33 And, how are the issues of protecting fish habitat by forgoing development opportunities (e.g., logging, mining, petroleum development) to be balanced?

The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU),34 which elaborated on elements within the PST, provided minimal guidance, slating that because data on salmon interceptions and total production by rivers of origin are imprecise, each nation's method for determining "benefits equivalent" may differ. Thus, the MOU stated that complete and comprehensive implementation of Article III (l)(b) would not be possible until some time in the future (no date or timeline was specified). The MOU stated that, in the short term, annual fishery regimes shall be conducted in an equitable manner and that "the Commission's decisions take into account changes in the benefits flowing to each of the Parties through alteration in fishing patterns, conservation actions, or as the result of changes in the abundance of the runs."

Despite the joint commitment embodied in the PST to conserve and protect the shared salmon stocks, the United States and Canada spent many years in a diplomatic stalemate, and the health of the salmon stocks has suffered as a result.36 Since the initial disagreements over the equitable sharing of intermingled stocks in the early 1990s, a number of mechanisms have been employed to resolve this issue. In 1993 and 1994, Canada and the United States appointed new negotiators to address the "benefits equivalent" principle. By 1995, government-to-government negotiations proved unsuccessful and New Zealand Ambassador Christopher Beebe was appointed to guide a mediation of the PST's equity principle (i.e., "benefits equivalent"). When this failed, the Parties established two stakeholder panels, composed of fishermen from both countries, in an attempt to settle the controversy. While stakeholder negotiations provided considerable progress, this process also eventually broke down.37

In August 1997, the United States and Canada appointed William Ruckelshaus and Dr. David Strangway, respectively, to conduct a joint investigation and to make recommendations for ending the controversy. Their report,38 published in January 1998, contains four specific recommendations:

1. The governments should cause to be adopted interim fishing-sharing arrangements for up to 2 years, stressing that it was incumbent on the governments to ensure that these arrangements are developed and implemented.

2. During the 2-year period, both Parties should develop a practical framework for implementing Article III (i.e., leading to establishment of long-term fishing arrangements.)

4. The Parties should also undertake a comprehensive review of the PSC and dedicate themselves to making it a functional institution for the preservation and management of Pacific Salmon.39

They concluded that to accomplish their recommendations, "meaningful compromises of positions strongly held will be necessary." Moreover, to ensure long- term sustainability of the shared resource, "rules must be established for the preservation of the [salmon] and time is not on their side."40

Disparate efforts to protect and conserve salmon habitat, which contributed to the relatively weak southern stocks and more robust northern stocks, may be equally to blame for the lack of stability in the PST regime. Southern boundary stocks (e.g., Pacific Northwest chinook salmon) have suffered extensively from habitat degradation. Most salmon stocks in the Pacific Northwest (and a few in some areas of southern British Columbia) have been subjected to major habitat damage from dams, irrigation projects, agriculture, logging, ports, and pollution. Such habitat damage can degrade salmon production without bearing any of the related costs of resource conservation. A significant problem with the PST was that the framers did not anticipate the magnitude of harm caused by non-fishing activities on Pacific Northwest stocks (and some isolated Canadian chinook stocks).41

As noted previously, since the last long-term harvest agreement expired in 1992, Canada and the United States have struggled bitterly over equitable harvest-sharing and conservation of salmon stocks. After years of failed negotiations, recent studies (e.g., Ruckelshaus-Strangway), joint-fishery restrictions to protect wild stocks, and the involvement of high-level government representatives (e.g., Lloyd Cutler) in 1999 helped to ease tensions between the United States and Canada. Moreover, the two nations recognized that failure to reach a long-term conservation and harvest-sharing agreement was in no one's best interest. In 1999, these factors permitted U.S. Negotiator James Pipkin and Canadian Negotiator Don McRae to overcome years of failed negotiations.

On June 3, 1999, Senior White House Representative on Pacific Salmon Lloyd Cutler, Canadian Fisheries Minister David Anderson, Alaska Governor Tony Knowles, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber, Washington Governor Gary Locke, and Tribal Negotiator Ted Strong announced that, after intensive negotiations extending over several years, U.S. and Canadian officials had reached a comprehensive agreement to resolve their long-standing dispute relating to Pacific salmon and the PST.42 On June 30, 1999, the United States and Canada formally signed the 1999 Agreement on Pacific Salmon. Terms of the agreement are discussed below.

The Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985, and U.S.
Decision-Making

The 1999 agreement was reached within the framework of the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-5, 99 Stat. 7; 16 U.S.C. 3631-3634). This Act implemented PST provisions and established the institutional framework for U.S. negotiations. The structure of the U.S. section has been a critical element in framing negotiations between the United States and Canada. Because this institutional framework is likely to affect future PST negotiations, a brief discussion of the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985 is warranted.

The Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985 is the implementing legislation for the PST. Section 3 defines the composition of the U.S. section to the PSC, the voting requirements for the U.S. section, and other matters necessary for U.S. participation in the PST. The U.S. section is composed of four members: a non-voting representative of the U.S. government, and three voting members from Alaska, Oregon or Washington, and the "treaty Indian tribes.43 Subsection (g) defines the voting requirements for the U.S. section, which operates "with the objective of attaining consensus decisions in the development and exercise of its single vote within the PSC.44 A decision of the U.S. section shall be taken when there is no dissenting vote."45 In the event that the U.S. section is unable to arrive at a consensus, section 3(g) of the Act authorizes the creation of a Conciliation Board to assist in resolving disputes.46 The Secretary of State, when concerned that the United States is in jeopardy of not fulfilling international obligations pursuant to the PST because of disputes within the U.S. section, is empowered to refer these matters to the President."47 If state or tribal actions or omissions place the United States in jeopardy of not fulfilling its international obligations under the PST, the Secretary of Commerce may take steps to supersede state or tribal fishery regulations.48

The structure of the U.S. section offers the opportunity for U.S. politics to paralyze the PSC.49 In contrast to the Canadian section, where the Canadian federal government decides the position to be taken by its section, the U. S. position is shaped by the state and tribal representatives in the U.S. section as defined by the Act. There is no U.S. federal government position, and the U.S. position is based solely on unanimity among its three voting Commissioners.50 However, the interests of Alaska, Washington/Oregon, and treaty tribes are often competing, and, in the past, have impaired the ability of the U.S. section to arrive at a unified position.51 Observers of the process suggest that an overarching difficulty that hindered past attempts to reach consensus is the lack of a requirement compelling the U.S. and Canadian Parties to reach an agreement. Related to this is the absence of any penalty for non-resolution. Because both countries could continue to fish in the absence of an agreed harvest regime, there is no incentive to reach agreement and the Parties can abandon negotiations without fear of consequences.

In sum, because the U.S. section is required by law to work by consensus, the PSC cannot make recommendations to the Parties without the approval of all voting members of the U.S. section. The PST's salmon fishing regimes are based entirely on the recommendations of the PSC.52 Many believe that the PST negotiation process has been hampered by the structure of the U.S. section, in which dissent by any single voting member can bring PST negotiations to a halt.

The 1999 Agreement ⁵³

On June 30, 1999, U.S. and Canadian officials signed a comprehensive agreement to resolve long-standing disputes relating to Pacific salmon and the PST. The agreement establishes abundance-based fishing regimes for the Pacific salmon fisheries under the jurisdiction of the PST. These regimes, which allow fishery harvest to vary from year to year, are designed to implement the conservation and harvest- sharing principles of the PST. That is, larger catches will be allowed when salmon abundance is higher, and catches will be significantly constrained in years when stock abundance is down. It is believed that this type of regime will be more responsive to the conservation requirements of salmon than the fixed-catch ceilings 54 that existed under the original PST arrangements.55

Additionally under the agreement, two bilaterally-managed regional funds are to be established: one covering northern and central British Columbia, and southeast Alaska; and the second covering southern British Columbia, the states of Washington and Oregon, and the Snake River basin in Idaho. The funds will be used to promote bilateral cooperation, improve fishery management, and aid stock and habitat enhancement efforts to improve the status of weakened salmon stocks. Subject to the availability of appropriated funds, the United States will contribute $75 million and $65 million to the two funds, respectively, over a 4-year period. In tacit recognition that U.S. fishermen have, for years, taken more than their fair share of salmon and will continue to do so under the new agreement, Canada would be compensated (i.e., through capitalization of these Funds by the United States) and will not initially contribute to the two Endowment Funds.56

The agreement also includes provisions to enhance bilateral cooperation, improve the scientific basis for salmon management, and apply institutional changes to the PSC. At the heart of the new accord is agreement between the Parties to focus on conservation and habitat protection, rather than division of shared salmon stocks. The new agreement:

• renews cooperation between the United States and Canada concerning the management of salmon;

• ensures that the conservation and harvest-sharing principles of the 1985 PST are realized;

• provides a firm and complementary base for other salmon recovery efforts, such as habitat restoration, underway in both countries to restore depleted stocks of salmon.

Abundance-Based Management

The cornerstone of the new fishing accord is abundance-based management. Under this management approach, harvest rates for each salmon stock are set relative to stock abundance. The objectives of abundance-based management are to:

• set a predictable framework for sharing the burdens of conservation and benefits of stock recovery;

• establish a common basis for stock assessment, fishery monitoring, and performance evaluation.

The Parties to the PST believe that the new management regimes will be more responsive to natural stock fluctuations and more environmentally responsible. To be effective, this approach will require an informed pre-season and a responsive in-season approach to fishery management. The Parties surmise that by matching harvest levels to actual salmon abundance, this management scheme will reduce the tendency to overfish, remove mortality resulting from ineffective live-release practices, and prevent unnecessary loss of fishing opportunities. They also believe that, under the new accord, curtailment in fishing will be shared proportionately among fishermen in all areas covered under the PST.

Fishery Regimes

Most elements of the agreement are contained in several new chapters that replace earlier expired versions of Chapters 1-6 of Annex IV of the PST. Additionally, an understanding was reached regarding management of certain northern fisheries affecting coho salmon, a topic not specifically covered in previous agreements.

Most of the new fishery arrangements will be in effect for 10 years, beginning in 1999. The arrangement for Fraser River sockeye will be in effect for 12 years, also beginning in 1999. The United States and Canada agree that the new fishery regimes are consistent with all the principles of the PST, and that compliance with those regimes constitutes satisfaction of all obligations under those principles.

Transboundary Rivers. This agreement specifies arrangements for sockeye, coho, chinook, and pink salmon management for several rivers that flow from Canada to the Pacific Ocean through southeast Alaska, including the Stikine, Taku, and Alsek Rivers. The United States and Canada agreed to establish a Transboundary Rivers Panel within the PSC to address transboundary river issues. Ongoing programs for joint enhancement of sockeye salmon in the Taku and Stikine Rivers will be continued.

Northern British Columbia and Southeast Alaska. This agreement addresses the management of sockeye and pink salmon fisheries in southeast Alaska and northern British Columbia The agreement specifies how the fisheries will be managed to achieve conservation and fair sharing of salmon stocks that intermingle in the border area between British Columbia and southeast Alaska. The fixed-catch ceilings contained in the expired agreements are replaced with abundance-based provisions that allow harvests to vary from year to year depending on the abundance of salmon. Several provisions, because they address long-contentious issues, are particularly noteworthy. These provisions will affect Alaska's purse seine fisheries near Noyes Island and gillnet fishery at Tree Point; and Canada's troll fishery for pink salmon and various marine net fisheries.

Chinook Salmon. Because they pass through fisheries regulated by many jurisdictions in both the United States and Canada, chinook salmon have been the focus of increasing concern and controversy. Although some chinook populations are relatively healthy, other chinook salmon stocks have been so diminished in recent years that they have been listed as threatened or endangered under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. Many factors, in addition to harvest, have contributed to the decline of these stocks, including: habitat destruction, water diversion, hydroelectric dams, and oceanic and climatic conditions. The Parties believe that the conservation-based fishery regimes established by this new agreement will help to ensure the effectiveness of public and private investments in habitat restoration and other aspects of salmon recovery.

The new chinook salmon regime encompasses marine and certain freshwater fisheries in Alaska, Canada, Washington, and Oregon. All chinook salmon fisheries will be managed based on abundance, rather than the fixed-catch quotas that applied previously. Two types of fisheries have been designated: (1) those that will be managed based on the aggregate abundance of chinook salmon present in the fishery, and (2) those that will be managed based on the status of individual stocks or stock groups in the fishery.

The three fisheries that have been designated for aggregate abundance-based management (AABM) are ocean fisheries that occur in large areas and affect a complex aggregation of many stocks. These are:

• northern British Columbia troll and Queen Charlotte Islands sport fisheries; and

Each of these AABM fisheries will be managed to achieve a specific harvest rate that varies based on an index of abundance of salmon present in that particular fishery for that particular year. Because each fishery is comprised of a different group of stocks that have different survival rates, the allowable catch will vary between fisheries and between years. Larger catches will be allowed when abundance is higher and, importantly, catches will be increasingly constrained when abundance is diminished. Table I in Chapter 3 of the new agreement's replacement of the PST's Annex IV provides maximum catch targets for each of the 3 AABM fisheries through the range of chinook abundance indices.

All other ocean and freshwater fisheries targeting chinook salmon have been designated for individual stock-based management (ISBM). Fisheries in this category include, but are not limited to:

• southern British Columbia marine net, troll and sport fisheries (other than the west coast Vancouver Island troll and sport fisheries); and

• all net, sport and troll marine and freshwater fisheries in Washington, Oregon, and the Snake River basin in Idaho.

The ISBM fisheries generally occur in marine waters closer to the rivers of origin, or directly in the rivers. These fisheries often are aimed at harvesting hatchery-produced salmon or species other than chinook. The catch in these fisheries is comprised of a relatively small number of chinook salmon stocks, some of which are currently depleted. Accordingly, these fisheries will fall under a "general obligation" that specifies certain reductions in exploitation rates relative to a 1979- 1982 base period. This general obligation requires Canada to maintain at least a 36.5% reduction in fishing mortality on chinook salmon stock groups identified as depleted relative to the base period. This general obligation requires the United States to maintain at least a 40% reduction relative to the same base period. In those cases where the general obligation is insufficient to achieve escapement objectives for natural stocks, additional reductions are to be taken as necessary to meet agreed escapement objectives or, when taken with the general obligation, are at least equivalent to the average reduction for the specific chinook stock group during the years 1991-1996.

The agreement provides a degree of flexibility allowing U.S. and Canadian management agencies to decide how best to distribute harvest across their various fisheries to reflect domestic fishery priorities, provided the over-all reductions are achieved. For some chinook stocks, the reduction will have to be much greater than the general obligation, due to the need to provide extra protection for certain very depleted stocks. The general obligation will not apply to hatchery stocks or healthy natural stocks that are achieving escapement objectives and can support harvest.57

In addition to predetermined harvest schedules, the new agreement specifies conditions (e.g., failure of a stock to meet agreed escapement objectives for 2 consecutive years) under which even greater harvest reductions will apply. These so-called "weak stock" provisions serve as a safety valve to afford additional protection to stocks that may fail to respond to broader recovery programs. Finally, the United States and Canada agreed to implement by 2002, subject to improvements in technical information, a total mortality approach to chinook fisheries, taking into account indirect or incidental mortality. This will provide more accurate information on which to make fishery management decisions. The new arrangements will introduce incentives to reduce incidental fishing mortality and harvest more selectively.

Fraser River Sockeye and Pink Salmon. The U.S. Department of State notes that, although much of the structure of previous agreements relating to the Fraser River is retained, the new agreement requires a substantial reduction in the U.S. share of Fraser River sockeye. This reduction will be phased in over the next three years and completed by the 2002 fishing season. When this reduction is completed, the U.S. share taken in Washington State fisheries will be 16.5% of the total allowable catch. (In contrast, the U.S. share of Fraser River sockeye, as specified in the original Annex IV to the 1985 PST, was approximately 26%.)

To mitigate the effect of the reduced share on commercial fishermen in Washington state, the Washington State Legislature and the U. S. federal government will be asked to contribute to a fishing vessel license buy-back program.58 This program will result in the removal of a significant portion of the Washington sockeye fishery. Because the buy-out affects only the non-Indian share, the usual 50/50 sharing rule (per the Boldt Decision)59 in Washington will be altered. The shares resulting from the revised sharing rule will be 68% for the treaty tribes and 32% for the non-tribal fishermen. This revised sharing rule applies only to U.S. harvest of Fraser River sockeye. The U.S. share of Fraser River pink salmon will be 25.7% of the total allowable catch.60

Coho Salmon. The coho agreement essentially provides a strategy and specifications (i.e., biological criteria) for a conservation-based regime covering border area fisheries in southern British Columbia and Washington State. The specifics of the regime will be cooperatively and bilaterally developed over the next year, in time to be implemented in 2000. The new regime will include rules establishing harvest limits in specified border area fisheries. The rules will be designed to limit exploitation rates on natural coho stocks to sustainable levels, taking into account all fisheries affecting the stocks, and thereby improving the long-term prospects of sustainable, healthy fisheries in both countries.

For southern coho stocks, abundance-based management will reduce catches to sustainable levels as the United States and Canada work to rebuild these depressed stocks. Specifically, beginning in 2000, the coho management program will:

• constrain fishing to enable natural coho stocks to produce long term sustainable harvests while maintaining genetic and ecological diversity;

• respond to the status of stocks, be cost-effective, and be flexible enough to take advantage of technical capabilities and information;

• provide a predictable framework for planning fishery impacts on natural stocks; and

• establish an objective basis for monitoring, evaluating and modifying the management regimes.

For northern coho stocks in times of low abundance, certain fisheries will be curtailed to assist conservation of these stocks. These closures include:

• southeast Alaskan troll fishery for 10 days from July 25 if early season catch indicators show a low abundance (less than I.I million total catch);

• border area 61 Alaskan fisheries for 3 weeks starting in statistical week 3,62 if the catch-per-unit of fishing effort (CPUE) does not reach 10;

• border area Alaskan fisheries for 2 weeks starting in statistical week 31 if CPUE does not reach 14; or

• border area Alaskan fisheries for 10 days starting in statistical week 31 if CPUE does not reach 22.

Southern British Columbia and Washington State Chum Salmon. This agreement incorporates refinements to provisions that trigger adjustments to chum salmon fisheries in the Strait of Georgia and Puget Sound. These refinements will have only a minor impact on catch allocation, but will improve the effectiveness of the regime. Additionally, at the request of the United States, Canada agrees to require the live release of chum salmon in certain Canadian net fisheries in southern boundary areas at those times of the year when "summer chum" (components of which have been listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act) may be present in the area. Specifically, from August I to September 15, Canadian purse seine vessels targeting sockeye and pink salmon in the Strait of Juan de Fuca are required to release chum salmon to protect threatened U.S. salmon stocks.

Regional Bilateral Funds

The agreement establishes two funds that are to be managed bilaterally and address science, restoration, and enhancement needs relating to salmon production. The Northern Boundary and Transboundary Rivers Restoration and Enhancement Fund (Northern Fund) would address needs in northern and central British Columbia, southeast Alaska, and the Alsek, Taku, and Stikine Rivers. The Southern Boundary Restoration and Enhancement Fund (Southern Fund) would address needs in southern British Columbia, the states of Washington and Oregon, and the Snake River basin in Idaho.

Subject to appropriations by Congress, the Northern and Southern Funds would be allocated $75 million and $65 million, respectively, by the United States, provided over 4 years. Diplomatic notes accompanying the agreement state that if initial funds are not made available by December 1999 or if additional installment payments are not made by the end ofFY2001 and FY2002 or if total payments for the two funds are not made available by the end of FY2003, the obligations under the 1999 agreement will be suspended until such funds are made available, unless both Parties agree otherwise. Either country, as well as third parties, may contribute to the Funds in the future, upon agreement of the Parties.

For each of the regional Funds, a bilateral committee composed of three representatives appointed by each of the two countries will be responsible for the approval of expenditures by the Funds. Annual expenditures will not exceed the annual earnings from the invested principal of each of the Funds; only the interest generated by the Funds would be expended. Expenditures will be suspended upon the expiration of the relevant chapters of Annex IV, and may continue only after new fishing arrangements are agreed to by the Parties.

The Funds will be used to: (1) improve resource management information (including data acquisition and improved scientific understanding of factors affecting salmon production); (2) rehabilitate, restore, and/or improve natural habitat to enhance the productivity and protection of Pacific salmon; and (3) enhance wild stock production using "low-technology" methods.

Renewed Cooperation on Scientific and Institutional Matters

The agreement includes a commitment by the two countries to improve how scientific information is obtained, shared, and applied to the management of the salmon resource. Among other things, the agreement encourages staff exchanges between management agencies, bilateral workshops, and participation in the public domestic management processes of the other country (e.g., the U. S. Regional Fishery Management Councils).

Additionally, a new bilateral Committee on Scientific Cooperation will be established under the PSC. To be comprised of as many as eight persons nominated by the two national sections of the PSC, the committee will assist the PSC in setting its scientific agenda, advise on research and monitoring needs, and assist in arranging peer review and evaluation of scientific reports. The PSC also will be encouraged to resolve scientific issues through its technical committees and asked to elaborate rules and procedures, as necessary, for implementing the process set out in Article XII of the PST for addressing technical disputes.63

Habitat

The agreement highlights the importance of habitat protection and restoration to achieving the long-term objectives of the Parties. While the primary focus of the agreement is on setting provisions that govern fishery management, it is well understood that achieving optimum production of salmon will depend on other initiatives as well. These include, but are not limited to, maintaining adequate water quality and quantity, achieving improved spawning success and migration corridors for adult and juvenile salmon, and other measures that maintain and increase the production of natural stocks. The PSC will report annually to the Parties to identify: (1) stocks for which measures beyond harvest controls are required and non-fishing factors that limit production; (2) options to address these factors; and (3) progress of the Parties in implementing measures to improve production.

This arrangement improves the conservation elements of the PST and extends the PST framework to include coordination on habitat protection objectives. This new provision supports the principle that stock conservation and rebuilding goals require coordinated and effective programs in freshwater to maintain productive habitat or restore degraded habitat, particularly, when it constrains sustaining populations at optimum production. The two Endowment Funds will provide tangible capacity to undertake remedial action to enhance the productivity of freshwater habitat. This new initiative on habitat is a necessary complement to the PSC's overall mandate to coordinate achievement of optimum production of salmon.

Continuing Concerns

The attention given to several continuing concerns by Congress, other U.S. officials, and fishery managers is likely to affect the degree to which bilateral salmon management under the 1999 agreement succeeds. These issues include:

• Acceptance of the 1999 Agreement. The 1999 agreement consists of more than simple amendments to the PST annex, which the PST provides for acceptance by exchange of notes. Thus, there is ambiguity over whether the PST is a separate treaty requiring Senate action, or merely a supplement to the existing treaty that improves its implementation. In either case, it calls for funding that can only come by way of congressional authorization and appropriation.

• Congressional appropriation of $140 million for the two Endowment Funds. Obligations under the 1999 agreement are contingent upon legislative authority and appropriations from the U.S. Congress for these two funds. The full capitalization of these two funds relies on repeated action by the U.S. Congress to appropriate monies over four years. Any hesitancy in providing this funding may be seen by Canada as a repudiation of U.S. responsibility for compensating Canada for larger U.S. salmon harvests in the recent past. In addition, the joint diplomatic statement accompanying the 1999 agreement states that the agreement will be "suspended" if funds are not available at times certain through FY2003, at least suggesting that, as noted above, acceptance of the agreement is contingent upon appropriation of funds by Congress.

• Allocation of and expenditures from the Endowment Funds. If these two funds were fully funded and grew at 10% interest, about $14 million would be available for expenditure annually, to be used for salmon restoration and enhancement projects benefiting both countries. If, however, the funds are not capitalized at the anticipated amount, Canada may regard the resulting interest insufficient, compared to the perceived damage U. S. fishing has caused Canadian salmon stocks.

• Equity. Since the 1999 agreement does not specifically and directly address the issue of salmon interceptions,64 many Canadians remain skeptical that this new agreement will result in any improvements toward each party receiving benefits equivalent to the production of salmon originating in its waters. For years, the United States and Canada have debated different interpretations of this objective and how it should be measured. In addition, Canadians call on the United States to abide by obligations under the PST's Memorandum of Understanding for implementing Article III, paragraph I (b), wherein the party with the advantage is to propose corrective measures. However, the new agreement does not provide any mechanism to reimburse one party if the other overharvests.

Decision-making within the U.S. section to the PSC. Section 3632(g)(l) of the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act of 1985 requires consensus among the U.S. section to the PSC before a decision can be made. Critics of U.S. section action charge that this requirement has been used as a ploy to paralyze operation of the PST and frustrate rational salmon management. If the inability to reach consensus within the U.S. section results in fishing activities that threaten the conservation of salmon stocks, the United States may be in breach of its PST obligations. In such circumstances, the federal government is to assume leadership, with the option for intervention and preemption.65 Past hesitancy of the U.S. federal government (i.e., the President, Secretary of State, and/or Secretary of Commerce) to exercise authority and assume this necessary leadership role has contributed to the erosion of a cooperative relationship with Canada beneficial to Pacific salmon.

Failure to include British Columbia. The exclusion by Canadian federal negotiators of British Columbia from negotiations leading to the 1999 agreement may be a recipe for failure, some contend. They suggest the United States should have requested that British Columbia remain involved since British Columbia is where the majority of the Canadian salmon originate. It is also the location of fishing and other interests affected by the implementation of the new agreement. For the new agreement to work, it probably must address regional interests pertaining to salmon as perceived by British Columbia, in addition to Canadian interests as perceived by the federal government in Ottawa. The cooperation of British Columbia fishing interests is probably essential to achieving rational management of Pacific coastal salmon stocks.

Perception by some Canadians of the 1999 agreement as a sellout of Canadian interests. Some Canadians feel the United States has been, and continues to be, the principal transgressor in failed salmon management, and always achieves the better outcome in any bilateral dealing. For example, many Canadians perceive that the United States has the ability to force Canada to curtail fisheries to address U.S. conservation concerns (e.g., Juan de Fuca summer-run chum salmon), but that Canada lacks any mechanism to force Alaska to do the same when Canada is concerned about conservation (e.g., southeast Alaska harvest restrictions are triggered by low U.S. coho abundance, not low Canadian coho abundance).66 Such attitudes will focus considerable attention on how the United States conducts itself in implementing the new agreement, particularly appropriations for and allocations from the two Endowment Funds.

Absence of any penalty for the non-resolution of disputes between the two Parties. The 1999 agreement does not specify salmon harvest limits, but is a very complex blueprint for the Parties to follow in promulgating harvest limits and taking other actions to conserve salmon fisheries. As such, it opens the door to considerable dispute. Canada has repeatedly sought the inclusion of binding arbitration as an option under the PST. However, the new agreement does not provide any additional incentive to settle differences (e.g., it does not prohibit both nations from fishing when no accord is reached). In addition, no enforcement mechanism is provided in the PST to guide action if one country should be out of compliance with the agreement or the PST.

Technical dispute resolution. The potential for technical disputes may increase under the new agreement, since harvest levels will be based on the determination of stock abundance levels. However, only Chapter 5 of the new Annex IV on coho salmon requires resolution of technical disputes under the provisions of Article XII of the PST. No similar provision is made for other fisheries in the 1999 agreement, and even the Article XII provisions appear to have been ineffective in the past. Thus, a broad-based and readily enforceable means of resolving disputes applicable to all technical disputes may be lacking.

Reliability of PSC science. Abundance-based management will work only if the supporting science is accurate, particularly as regards salmon abundance forecasts. Both nations may gain from committing themselves to promoting greater objectivity and cooperation in the conduct of their scientists.

Use of selective fishing methods. Canada has asserted that its future salmon fisheries will operate differently than in the past, with harvestable fish being selectively targeted to avoid undesired bycatch of wild or weak stocks. Fin marking 67 by U.S. management agencies also promotes selective fishing. The degree to which selective fishing practices can be used in mixed-stock fisheries by both nations to protect weaker, wild stocks will minimize conflicts between fishing and the laws and programs seeking to protect threatened and endangered species.

Footnotes

2 Interception means the capture of salmon originating in one country by the fishing fleets of another. Salmon intermingle as they migrate from the "North Pacific Ocean back to their natal rivers, crossing the international boundaries of the United States and Canada. Salmon returning to spawn in Canadian rivers are incidentally captured ("intercepted") in U.S. fisheries, and salmon returning to U.S. rivers are intercepted in Canadian fisheries.

3 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon. TIAS11091. Ottawa, Canada: 1985.

4 Article 1(1) of the PST defines enhancement as "man-made improvements to natural habitats or application of artificial fish culture technology that will lead to the increase of salmon stocks."

5 Many salmon stocks in Washington, Oregon, California, and Idaho are currently at or near historically low levels of abundance. Recent listings under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. 1361, et seq.) confirm the depleted status of some of these stocks. For more information, see CRS Report 98-666 ENR, Pacific Salmon and Anadromous Trout: Management Under the Endangered Species Act.

6 Since 1985, Canadians assert that the United States has taken an annual average of about 9 million more Canadian-origin fish than Canada has harvested of U.S.-origin salmon, representing lost value to Canada in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

7 In 1998, Canada curtailed a number of its commercial salmon fisheries, especially troll fisheries, in response to evidence of lower abundance of some stocks.

8 M. Drouin and B. Warren, "U.S./Canada: Progress or Politics?" Pacific Fishing, vol. XX, no.6 (June 1999): 37.

9 Id.

11 Anadromous fish begin their lives in freshwater rivers and lakes, migrate while young to the open ocean where they mature, and return to freshwater (often to their natal rivers) to spawn. Anadromous species include Atlantic and Pacific salmon, shad, eulachon (Columbia River smelt), striped bass, et al.

12 Cherry salmon (Oncorhynchus masou) is also a Pacific salmon, but primarily occurs on the Asian coast, so it is not a concern under the PST.

13 Migration patterns of salmon are determined by using fish tags. Juvenile salmon can be implanted with coded-wire tags specific to their drainage of origin. When a tagged salmon is caught in the ocean, encoded information reveals the drainage from which the fish originated. Plausible migratory routes between the location of marine capture and the drainage of origin can be identified and further clarified as additional tag recoveries offish from the same drainage are recorded from the population's entire migratory route.

14 This report focuses on the salmon species covered by the PST. However, other international agreements pertaining to Pacific salmon fisheries exist, e.g., the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission, which was established under the Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean, signed on February II, 1992 and entering into force on February 16, 1993 (Senate Treaty Document 102-30, 102"d Congress, Z"d Session). Parties to this Convention include Canada, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the United States. The goal of this Convention is to promote the conservation of anadromous stocks in the North Pacific Ocean [ http://www.npafc.org/ ].

15 K.. A. Thomson, et al. "The influence of ocean currents on the latitude of landfall and migration speed of sockeye salmon returning to the Fraser River." Fisheries Oceanography, v. 1, no. 2 (1992): 163-179.

16 Salmon migration patterns complicate negotiations. For example, upper Columbia River chinook stocks (along with Oregon and Washington coastal chinook) are predominantly wild fish that migrate far north. These fish are caught in southeast Alaska and northern British Columbia. Lower Columbia River chinook stocks are predominantly hatchery fish, which typically do not migrate north of Vancouver Island. These fish are caught in southern British Columbia and in oceanic Washington fisheries. Thus, U.S. hatchery salmon are caught by Canadian fisheries off the west coast of Vancouver Island, while Alaskan and Canadian fisheries compete for upper Columbia River wild stocks. Because depleted wild stocks, unlike hatchery stocks, cannot withstand substantial fishing pressure, competitive fishing begets problems for the United States concerning conservation, Indian treaty allocation, and the U.S. Endangered Species Act. Canada recognizes these concerns and, in the past, has exploited these circumstances to influence the U.S. negotiating position.

18 D. Gilbert. Fish for Tomorrow. Seattle, WA: University of Washington, School of Fisheries, 1988. p. 10.

19 T.C. Jensen. "The United States-Canada Pacific Salmon Interception Treaty: An Historical and Legal Overview." Environmental Law, vol. 16, no. 3 (1986): 373.

22 U.S. fishermen dependent on Fraser River salmon objected to ratification. Before 1934, U.S. sockeye harvest far exceeded Canadian harvest. After 1935, strict Washington state fishing regulations (eliminating certain gear types) greatly reduced U.S. sockeye harvest, and the U.S. perspective on the Convention quickly changed. Jensen, supra note 19. p. 374, note 24. "In 1936, the British Columbia catch was more than triple that of Puget Sound." J.A. Crutchfield and G. Pontecorvo. The Pacific Salmon Fisheries: A Study of Irrational Conservation. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. p. 141.

23 United States-Canada Convention for the Protection, Preservation and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fishery in the Fraser River System, signed May 26, 1930, 50 Stat. 1355 (1930) 8 UST 1058, TIAS No. 3867.

26 Gilbert, supra note 18. p. 82. It should also be noted that, while the Commission had no power to enforce limits on fishing, in practice its recommendations were implemented by the United States and Canada. See Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, id., p. 142, footnote 22.

27 Several changes in the United States and Canada created new pressures, which eroded the footings provided by the 1937 agreement. These include: (1) the Boldt Decision (United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp 312 (W.D. Wash 1974), aff'd, 500 F. 2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976)) which entitled certain U.S. treaty tribes to 50% of the U.S. harvest of salmon passing through "usual and accustomed waters;" (2) the rise of the recreational fishing industry, which added pressure on coho and chinook salmon; (3) the advent of salmon aquaculture as a powerful economic and political force; (4) the increased Canadian harvest of sockeye outside of Convention Waters made possible by new technologies that allowed Canadian trollers to efficiently catch sockeye in the ocean; and (5) the increased catch of Canadian net fisheries in northern British Columbia, also outside of Convention Waters. Because of these latter two points, while sockeye catch in Convention Waters was shared equally, fish caught outside of these waters (and not counted under the sharing- agreement) reduced the U.S. share from 50% to about 41%. Many U.S. fishermen, who had already lost half of their share to treaty Indians, were concerned that their share would continue to decline further as the Canadians increased fishing outside of Convention Waters. Thus, these U.S. fishermen were easily persuaded that a new treaty could be in their best interest.

30 In practice, all eight Commissioners from each section have attended Commission meetings and been involved in all decision-making.

32 Daniel D. Huppert. Why the Pacific Salmon Treaty Failed to End the Salmon Wars. SMA 95-1. Seattle, WA: University of Washington, 1995. p. 12.

33 Ownership and residency also complicate the issue. Many companies operating in Alaska and British Columbia are either owned by the same parent company or are subsidiaries. Many permit holders for southeast Alaska commercial fisheries are not residents of Alaska, and a large number of U.S. citizens participate in Canadian recreational fisheries.

34 Treaty Between the Govemment of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon. Memorandum of Understanding. §A. Implementation of Article III, paragraph l(b). Ottawa, Canada: 1985.

35 In developing such proposals, imbalances should be addressed where possible through enhancement programs rather than adjustments in established fisheries. See Richard Lugar, Congressional Record, vol. 31, part 4 (Mar. 7, 1985): 4772.

36 Trout Unlimited USA and Trout Unlimited Canada. Resolving the Pacific Salmon Treaty Stalemate. Seattle, WA: 1999. p. 1.

38 David W. Strangway and William D. Ruckelshaus. Pacific Salmon Report to the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States. Ottawa, Canada: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 1998.

41 The gauntlet presented by dams, river channelization, agriculture, and pollution causes significant harm (some say as much as 90% of human-caused mortality) to certain chinook salmon stocks. However, these diversified industries, causing substantial salmon mortality, are not involved in PST negotiations. While the PST is unable to address these threats to salmon stocks, many of these salmon stocks have received protection under the authority of the Endangered Species Act.

42 Attributable in large measure to Canadian domestic politics, British Columbia was excluded from the negotiations leading to the 1999 agreement.

44 All decisions of the Commission must be made by a unanimous vote, and clearly this will ensure that the views of each will be heard and will also mean that the Commissioners will have to work closely to arrive at decisions that will protect the interests of all parties." Frank H. Murkowski, in: Pacific Salmon Treaty. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. S. Hrg. 99-19. Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, Feb. 22, 1985. See also: Ted Stevens. "United States-Canada Salmon Treaty Negotiations: The Alaskan Perspective." Environmental Law, v. 16 (1986): 423-424.

45 16 U.S.C. 3632(g)(l). However, this language does not say that a decision may not be taken by the U.S. section when there is a dissenting vote.

46 Although use of the conciliation provision has been discussed, the Conciliation Board has not been convened to resolve disputes within the U.S. section.

47 This step has never been taken. The President has both the power and duty to take whatever actions are necessary to carry out and enforce U.S. obligations under the PST, including preemption of the U.S. section if conflict threatens salmon conservation.

49 See Robert J. Schmidt, Jr., "International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission." Environmental Law, vol. 26 (1995): 108.

50 In addition, if an alternate Commissioner disagreed about an issue, the U.S. section vote would not be unanimous. Although informal, this practice was generally followed.

53 Compiled from the U.S. Department of State, information available at: [ http://www.state.gov/www/global/oes/oceans/990630_salmon_index.html ]; and the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans, information available at: [ http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/pst-tsp/main_e.htm ]

55 However, while generally supportive of abundance-based management, for this approach to work, both nations need to develop better scientific methods for pre-season estimations of abundance (fishery managers in the past have tended to over-estimate stock abundance). It is a questionable management presumption that reductions in catch and improvements in habitat will actually occur.

56 T. Kenworthy and S. Pearlstein. "U.S., Canada Reach Landmark Pact on Pacific Salmon Fishing," Washington Post (June 4, 1999): p. A17.

57 Neither these stocks nor how "health" is determined are specified in the information provided by the U.S. Department of State or the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans.

58 NMFS officials believe §312(b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act provides sufficient authority for implementation of this buy-back program.

60 Because pink and sockeye salmon are often caught in the same fishery, the rules affecting one fishery may also affect another. It is unclear whether catching the allocated amount of one species will halt the entire fishery, which could result in forgone catch of the other species.

61 Includes the southern portions of Districts 101, 102, 103, and 104, and all of District 152.

62 Statistical weeks in Alaska's state fisheries begin on January I, with statistical week I ending on the first Saturday in January. Statistical week 31 is, approximately, the last week in July.

63 Although most disputes under the PSC relate to technical issues, such as run-size predictions and total allowable catch, the PSC's Article XII provisions for technical dispute resolution were rarely, if ever, used. The modifications in the new accord aim to promote scientific decision-making more independently of political and policy pressures. In the past, scientists related to the PSC and salmon management appeared, with rare exception, unable to reach objective conclusions, with analyses uniformly supporting their parent agency's desires. This lack of objectivity was apparent when scientists working with identical data uniformly reached self-serving, different conclusions.

64 For example, particular concerns remain about the southeast Alaska pink salmon fishery in District 4 intercepting increasing numbers of Canadian sockeye salmon after statistical week 31.

65 Theodore G. Kronmiller. Pacific Salmon Treaty. Hearing, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Feb. 22, 1985, p. 45.

66 Canadians are concerned about what they refer to as liberal trigger mechanisms regarding this coho fishery. Some claim that if the new formula were applied to past years, it would have resulted in only one 10-day pause in Alaska fishing in the past two decades.

67 Prior to releasing juvenile salmon from a hatchery, the adipose fin of each fish is removed (i.e., clipped) to permit quick visual identification of the usually more abundant hatchery fish when they return as adults. During a selective fishery, non-marked (i.e., wild stock) fish that are caught can be released in a manner that minimizes mortality.